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ABSTRACT
 The belief that legal argument makes a difference to the resolution of legal disputes is 
one of the most fundamental tenets of the American legal system. Despite its importance, 
few have empirically examined whether and how legal argument matters to the adjudica-
tion of a dispute. In this article, we discuss our design and implementation of a new behav-
ioral experiment that allows us to observe some of the effects of legal argument in the simu-
lated judicial resolution of a politically divisive case. Our subjects, recent law school gradu-
ates and law students, acted as judges in such a case.  
 The results from this experiment provide support for the notion that legal argument 
matters but not in the ways that its proponents expect. Firstly, legal argument had an effect 
on our subjects only when the applicable law was a bright-line, constraining rule. Secondly, 
within those parameters, it appears that the presence of legal argument made our subjects 
less likely to resolve their cases in accordance with the straightforward interpretation of 
that rule and more likely to choose the outcome that they personally preferred. 
 The results further support a new understanding of the function of argumentation in 
the context of legal decisionmaking, one that does not fit the charitable account advanced in 
our law and by our law schools. Rather than serving as one of the key components of an 
environment in which the most persuasive legal justifications rise to the top, legal argument 
might serve as an instrument for judges to reach their desired results with less effort. In our 
simulation, legal argument appears to have provided such a shortcut, and one that our 
subjects used to further personal or ideological ends. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 In a very obvious sense, arguments matter. Indeed, they matter so 
much that we often work very hard to avoid them. At one time or an-
other, everyone has insisted that he or she does not want to argue, 
demanded that someone stop arguing, or regretted that he or she had 
started an argument. Many of us can cite an argument as the reason 
that we ended a serious relationship.1 And almost no one wants to 
earn a reputation for being argumentative.2
 On the other hand, if you are reading this article, chances are 
good that you are in the argument business. Lawyers get paid for an-
ticipating and drafting arguments. Law professors get paid for teach-
ing students how to make arguments. Judges get paid for weighing 
arguments against each other. And law students hope to get paid for 
doing any one of those things. We might hate argument, but there 
are at least economic reasons for us to love legal argument.  
 Of course, the distinction between argument and legal argument 
is a hazy one.3 Some types of arguments, such as arguments as to the 
basic fairness of something, are as prevalent in non-legal contexts as 
they are in legal ones. While this makes the question as to the pre-
cise location of the border between legal and non-legal argument 
philosophically interesting, that is not our concern here. Rather, we 
seek to include under the umbrella of legal argument those types of 
argument that are typically raised in undoubtedly legal contexts, 
                                                                                                                  
 1. Cf. ALISON CLARKE-STEWART & CORNELIA BRENTANO, DIVORCE: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 146-48 (2006) (discussing relationship between spousal argument and 
divorce in research of childhood development). 
 2. It is notable that the example sentence for the first definition of “argumentative” 
in a prominent online dictionary focuses on aspirants to the legal industry. Argumentative 
Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/argumentative (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2013) (“fond of or given to argument and dispute; disputatious; contentious: 
The law students were an unusually argumentative group.”).
 3. The related question of whether legal reasoning is distinct from reasoning in gen-
eral has long attracted the attention of legal philosophers. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
Conference: The Path of the Law Today: A World Apart? An Essay on the Autonomy of the 
Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 747, 758 (1998) (“Both historically and currently, most of the debate 
among lawyers and legal philosophers concerning autonomy has focused on the nature of 
legal reasoning. The debates differ in the antagonist to the claim of autonomy; that is, they 
differ in their views concerning what non-legal considerations enter into legal reasoning.”).
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such as trial hearings or appellate briefs. Fortunately, there are sev-
eral examples of argument that clearly fall within these contexts, and 
we use the label “legal argument” to characterize them. To be clear, 
the arguments that we are characterizing as legal are not of the sort 
that would be unwelcome in non-legal contexts, rather we contend 
only that they would be welcome in legal contexts.  
 To identify a handful of these arguments, we need only consider 
the largely patterned manner in which lawyers seek to win disputes: 
advocates typically raise arguments regarding the facial meaning of 
authoritative legal documents (“text” arguments), the coherent inter-
pretation of binding judicial decisions (“precedent” arguments), the 
intent of those that drafted a law (“legislative intent” arguments), 
and/or the policy implications of resolving the dispute in their favor 
(“public policy” arguments).4 These argument types should be famil-
iar; they are taught at a very early stage of law school. Indeed, the 
Carnegie Report, arguably the impetus behind the ongoing effort to 
reform and rehabilitate legal education,5 went so far as to claim that 
the first year of law school transforms us into believing that such ar-
guments make up the “legal landscape” itself.6 While this list of legal 
arguments is not exhaustive, and it is possible that some examples 
might additionally fit into other categories of argument, there can be 
little doubt that they are representative of the kinds of claims that  
lawyers make.  
 As it is so central to our legal profession, we might expect that the 
empirical scholarship on the effects of legal argument would be vast. 
It is not. Legal scholars appear to have their own uniquely incongru-
ous relationship with legal argument: they very often concoct legal 
arguments, but they seldom examine how legal arguments matter to 
the adjudication of the disputes to which they apply. It is tempting to 
excuse this asymmetrical research program using common sense: le-
gal argument would not be so pervasive were it inconsequential. But 
even if this intuition is right—and this can be doubted7—it still 
                                                                                                                  
 4. This typology is drawn from the very popular law school textbook: WILSON HUHN,
THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 13-16 (2d ed. 2008).
 5. See Editorial, Legal Education Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/opinion/legal-education-reform.html?_r=0.    
 6. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 54 (2007) (“Law students, that is, are learning to live conceptually in 
what Mertz calls a ‘legal landscape,’ a conceptual space that is defined purely in terms of  
legal argument . . . .”).
 7. Some commentators, often judges, doubt whether legal argument makes a differ-
ence in certain narrow circumstances, such as during oral argument on appeal. See, e.g.,
Mark R. Kravitz, Words to the Wise, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 543, 545-46 (2003) (“[S]ome 
appellate judges privately grouse that oral argument is a waste, both of their time and the 
litigants’ money.”). Virtually no one doubts, however, that legal argument, as a general 
matter, has some effect on judicial decisionmaking. Perhaps Lawrence Friedman comes 
closest, but even he concedes that legal arguments make “extremely small” differences. See
Lawrence M. Friedman, Taking Law and Society Seriously, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 529, 532 
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leaves us with much to learn about how legal argument matters. 
What little relevant scholarship exists tends to focus on the related 
but distinct topic of whether the presence of professional8 or high 
quality representation matters.9 Our focus here is narrower and more 
fundamental; we want to know more about the effects of legal argu-
ment itself. How would adjudication be without it?  
 Our constitutional jurisprudence articulates a particular account 
of how legal argument impacts adjudication. The Supreme Court has 
premised the very right to counsel, at least in part,10 upon it.11 Under 
a distinct set of circumstances, parties have a constitutional right to 
retain an advocate who will make legal arguments that both advance 
their legally permissible interests and are colorable interpretations of 
the law.12 These positions constitute the set of “valid” legal argu-
ment.13 If both sides of an issue are represented by zealous advocates 
                                                                                                                  
(1999) (“I hate to be raining on the parade, but my view, in brief, is that formal legal argu-
ment as such probably does not make much of a difference in the world.”).
 8. Among the best examples of this sort of scholarship is the article by Greiner, Pat-
tanayak, and Hennessey, in which the authors designed a randomized control trial that 
allowed them to compare the outcomes in summary eviction proceedings between those 
who received full representation from a legal services organization and those who received 
limited “unbundled” legal assistance from that same organization. See D. James Greiner et 
al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts 
District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 925-27 (2013). Among 
other things, they found that a significantly higher percentage of the litigants in the former 
category were able to remain in their homes. See id.  
 9. See discussion infra Part II.B.
 10. Of course, it is equally clear that the right to counsel is also rooted in notions of 
procedural fairness. The landmark Supreme Court decisions guaranteeing the right to 
counsel were largely focused on guaranteeing equal access to counsel. See, e.g., Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (premising right to counsel in criminal trial on Due Pro-
cess Clause); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (premising right to counsel in first 
criminal appeal on Equal Protection Clause). Even so, procedural fairness owes much of its 
constitutional importance to the fact that it is perceived to make a difference to the deter-
minations made thereunder. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (“The right 
to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel. . . . [A person charged with a crime] requires the guiding hand of counsel 
at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces 
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”).
 11. Recently, the Supreme Court stated:  
The earliest case generally cited for the proposition that ‘the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel,’ was based on the Due Process 
Clause rather than on the Sixth Amendment. And even our recognition of the 
right to effective counsel within the Sixth Amendment was a consequence of 
our perception that representation by counsel ‘is critical to the ability of the ad-
versarial system to produce just results.’ 
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (citations omitted) (quoting 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 685 (1984)).
 12. See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (guaranteeing right to counsel in criminal trial).
 13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2007) (“A lawyer shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law 
2013]          FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT 541
making valid legal arguments—as is legally mandated14—judges are 
most likely to be presented with the best possible arguments on ei-
ther side of a legal issue.15 As a result, judges are better informed and 
are more likely to reach the correct result in a case, thus serving the 
interests of justice. This account of legal argument’s role in adjudica-
tion has been called the “Legalist” position, perhaps because it shares 
many of the critical assumptions of the “Legal Model” of judging16
and Liberal Legalism more generally.17
 Many individuals are unconvinced that legal arguments perform 
such a salutary civic function. Instead, many adherents to the Criti-
cal18 view contend that legal argument serves to obscure or, worse 
yet, to fictionalize law’s directives rather than to elucidate them, 
when it matters at all. “A . . . Legalist . . . believes that legitimate 
legal argument helps us to achieve justice. [On the other hand,  
m]any Crits believe that legitimate legal argument is an opiate of the 
                                                                                                                  
and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an ex-
tension, modification or reversal of existing law.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278 n.10 (2000); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 
U.S. 157, 189 (1986). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s 
Responsibilities ¶ 2 (2007) (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position 
under the rules of the adversary system.”).
 15. See, e.g., Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
vacated for want of jurisdiction, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (“[T]he adversary system is based on 
the premise that the truth is best ascertained . . . through the zealous and competent 
presentation by each side of its strongest case.”); Greiner et al., supra note 8 (discussing 
proposition that cases in which both parties are represented are more likely to have 
reached correct legal outcomes). 
 16. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64 (1993) (“The legal model . . . holds that the Supreme Court decides 
disputes before it in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis precedent, the plain meaning of 
the Constitution and statutes, the intent of the framers, and a balancing of societal versus 
constitutional interests.”); David Landau, The Two Discourses in Colombian Jurispru-
dence: A New Approach to Modeling Judicial Behavior in Latin America, 37 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 687, 688-89 (2005) (describing the Legal Model as Legalist, stating, “The chal-
lengers to attitudinal and strategic scholars are a loosely defined group of academics iden-
tified as legalists; they believe that judicial behavior is best seen not as an attempt to max-
imize some political policy goal to which the judge is attached, but as a response, at some 
level, to the judge’s notion of what the law is. . . . Legalist models have thus not gotten very 
far beyond focusing on mechanical adherence to precedent.”).
 17. Motoaki Funakoshi, Taking Duncan Kennedy Seriously: Ironical Liberal Legalism,
15 WIDENER L. REV. 231, 276 (2009) (“[L]iberal legalists believe that legal interpretation is 
a matter of application of the method well defined in advance, which thereby warrants  
necessitarian truth . . . .”). 
 18. There is, of course, a well-known strand of legal theory known as Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS), and its members are often referred to as “Crits.” See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 41 (2008). The Critical position that we describe here shares 
many similarities with CLS, but we do not label it as such because we wish for it to be more 
inclusive than CLS: it includes all viewpoints that express doubt as to the truth of the Legalist 
account of legal argument’s effect on adjudication, whether for formal or behavioral reasons. 
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masses—i.e., conceals the unjust realities of our culture and retards  
its reformation.”19
 One way to explain the differences between Legalists and Crits on 
this front is to consider their views on the constraining power of law 
itself—that is, on the ability of law to provide clear directives to judg-
es as to how correctly to resolve cases (the formal dimension of con-
straint) and the likelihood that judges will follow those directives even 
if they would otherwise prefer not to (the behavioral dimension).20
 On the one hand, the Legalist account assumes that, in most cas-
es, the law provides directives that will lead judges to the internally 
correct or best answer21 with reasonable effort. As a result of this 
formal clarity, valid legal arguments tend to play an information-
gathering role, providing the judge considering them with the re-
sources that she needs to find the correct answer.22 Legal argument 
also serves a behavioral function. It helps to keep judges honest by 
making the best arguments for each side more obvious to higher 
courts and the general public; it makes judges who disregard supe-
rior arguments more likely to suffer criticism. For the Legalist, 
                                                                                                                  
 19. Richard S. Markovits, “You Cannot Be Serious!”: A Reply to Professors Balkin and 
Levinson, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 575 (1999).  
 20. The formal dimension of constraint comes from the clarity of the content of a legal 
directive in connection with a case; whereas the behavioral dimension comes from the mo-
tivations of the judge interpreting the legal directive. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 146 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994) (discussing possibility that judges are capable 
of choosing whether to be constrained by even the “clearest,” most formally constraining 
laws because it is “never psychologically or physically impossible for human beings to 
break or repudiate them”).
 21. Judge Posner is fond of the term “Legalism.” See Richard A. Posner, Realism 
About Judges, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 578 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (describing a more 
extreme, yet, in his opinion, commonplace legalist position, “[T]he legalists, believe (or 
pretend to believe) that adjudication is strictly analytical, with no tincture of ideology, no 
taking sides on issues of social or economic policy. The legalist theory of adjudication re-
ceived its canonical modern expression by John Roberts at his senatorial confirmation 
hearing to be Chief Justice in 2005, when he said that the role of a Supreme Court Justice, 
which he would faithfully inhabit, was similar to that of a baseball umpire, who calls balls 
and strikes but does not make or alter the rules of baseball. This was echoed four years 
later by Sonia Sotomayor at her confirmation hearing. . . . The modern idea of the judge as 
analyst shares with the idea of the judge as oracle the assumption that legal questions 
always have right answers: answers that can be produced by transmission from an author-
itative source, though in the modern view the transmission is not direct but is mediated  
by analysis.”).  
Other scholars have adopted Posner’s description. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Judicial Charac-
ter (and Does It Matter), 26 CONST. COMMENT. 97 (2009) (describing “legalism” using Rich-
ard Posner’s description as the belief that “a judicial decision [can] be determined by a body 
of rules constituting the ‘law’ rather than by factors that are personal to judges, in the 
sense of varying among them, such as ideology, personality, and personal background” and 
stating “in the legalist universe, all judges are potentially the same, all have the same 
task, and all are working from the same materials in search of an elusive but non-mythical 
beast: the ‘right answer’ to a legal question” (citations omitted) (quoting POSNER, supra 
note 18, at 41)).
 22. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 41.
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then, legal argument serves mostly as a safeguard to make judges 
less error-prone. 
 On the other hand, a well-known view among Critics is that inter-
nally correct right legal answers are quite rare, if they exist at all.23
On account of this formal weakness, legal arguments provide, at best, 
superficially convincing justifications for deciding cases in spite of the 
fact that those justifications do not lead us to internally correct an-
swers. Accordingly, legal argumentation that deigns to have identi-
fied the single correct answer in a dispute is posturing, but a danger-
ous sort of posturing. Arguments serve as ready-made justifications 
that assist the judge in crafting a decision that gives the false im-
pression of having been derived directly from the dictates of law.24 In 
short, legal arguments are little more than a means for judges to lull 
the general public into believing that the judges’ decisions are dictated  
by law. 
 Somewhere in the vast space between those positions are those 
who believe that the law frequently provides directives that can lead 
judges to right answers but that those directives are often unclear or 
otherwise difficult to discover.25 On this account, such cases are nu-
merous but not overwhelming, with larger concentrations of them in 
the appellate courts.26 When cases are difficult in this way, there is 
greater opportunity for legal argumentation to play an important role 
in determining their outcomes because the judges in those cases will 
be more inclined to view argumentation as a useful resource, not for 
tricking the general public, but for reaching right or best answers. 
While this version of the story sounds a lot like the Legalist account, 
Critics would be inclined to point out that law’s formal obscurity lim-
its the error correction function of legal argument; if there is no cor-
rect outcome in a case, then legal argument is incapable of making a 
                                                                                                                  
 23. See generally J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Getting Serious about “Taking 
Legal Reasoning Seriously,” 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543 (1999) (noting inconsistencies be-
tween actual legal argument practice and notion that there are correct legal answers in  
most cases).
 24. See id. at 547-48.
 25. The most sophisticated Legalist, Ronald Dworkin, admits that “hard cases” re-
quire “Herculean” effort, whereas easy cases are merely “hard” yet feasible for the judge 
putting forth the effort. See Ronald Dworkin, Response, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1080 (2010); 
Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
 26. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme 
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1563 (2008) 
(“The emergence of the modern Supreme Court Bar is significant because advocacy mat-
ters. Better, more effective advocates influence the development of the law and there is 
generally no court where such advocacy can wield more far-reaching influence than the 
Supreme Court. . . . In recent years, the impact is expressed by a rise in the Court's busi-
ness docket as the Court has responded favorably to the legal arguments raised on behalf 
of business interests that serve as the private Supreme Court Bar's primary clients.”). 
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judge in that case more likely to arrive at one.27 Making matters 
worse, advocates are not uniformly talented, experienced, resourced, 
or hard working. Some are more persuasive than others. As a result, 
judicial decisions tend to favor those individuals, groups, or entities 
that have superior counsel regardless of what the right legal answer  
might be.28
 Also residing between the two poles are those who believe that, 
even if a case could turn on a straightforward legal rule, it is likely 
that judges will be motivated to accord greater weight to the argu-
ments of the side that seeks to bring about the outcome that those 
judges prefer regardless of the rule.29 As a result of the behavioral in-
firmities of judges, the proffered legal arguments serve as little more 
than shortcuts on the road to providing an ostensibly legal justifica-
tion to disguise the fact that a judge’s decision was ideologically or  
personally motivated. 
 Thus, scholars who believe that valid legal argument in the adver-
sarial system primarily helps judges discover the correct outcome in 
the dispute in which they are raised assume both that the law, itself, 
admits of reasonably discoverable right answers in the typical case 
and that judges will generally choose to heed those answers when 
they decide cases.30 As described, critics of legal argument tend to 
disagree with one or both parts of that assumption.  
 Frank Cross recently stated, “[w]hether the judge is deciding [cas-
es] according to the better legal arguments or to his or her ideology is 
the question. Quantitative empirical research is suited to help an-
swer [it].”31 It is clear from the theoretical debate surrounding legal 
argument that any quantitative research will have to account for 
the constraining power of the legal norms that are understood to 
apply to a case. That is, an empirical study must account for a law’s 
intrinsic capacity to cause a judge to decide in accordance with its 
directive when that judge would prefer, in the absence of that law, to  
decide otherwise.  
                                                                                                                  
 27. Cf. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 23 at 544-48 (discussing how view that there 
is no correct outcome can undermine our faith in salutary functions of legal argument  
and reasoning).
 28. See Lazarus, supra note 26.
 29. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 744-49 (2000) (footnotes omitted) 
(“The second or sharply negative view is often associated with what political scientists call 
the ‘attitudinal model’ of judicial behavior. This model posits that judges have fixed ideo-
logical preferences, and that case outcomes are a product of the summing of the preferences 
of the participating judges, with legal norms serving only to rationalize outcomes after the 
fact. Under this view, amicus briefs should have little or no impact on the outcomes 
reached by a court, because each judge’s vote in a case is assumed to be the product of his 
or her preestablished ideological preferences with respect to the issue presented.”).
 30. See id.; Markovits, supra note 19.
 31. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 14 (2007).
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 Recent studies (including one that inspired this project)32 have 
produced empirical evidence supporting that not only does law con-
strain, but also that the content of legal norms changes their con-
straining power.33 Specifically, they provide support for the proposi-
tion that rules constrain more than do standards.34 Generally speak-
ing, legal rules are norms with content that limits judicial discretion 
by conditioning compliance upon bright-line or similarly descriptive 
criteria; a numerical speed limit is an example of a legal rule.35 They 
permit straightforward adjudication: the law sets a speed limit of 30 
mph, the defendant was traveling 50 mph, so therefore the defendant 
has violated the law.36 Legal standards are at the opposite end of the 
constraint spectrum: they have content that invites discretion by con-
ditioning compliance upon moral or other evaluative criteria; the cruel 
and unusual punishment test is an example of a legal standard.37
 In light of the relationship between legal argument and law’s con-
straining power, the presence of legal argument should have a differ-
ent impact depending on whether the law at issue is a rule or a 
standard. Secondly, we can expect that some proportion of judges will 
be motivated to reach outcomes that they prefer. When these judges 
face a clear directive that is at odds with that outcome, such as they 
would find in a case dictated by a single rule, we can expect that they 
will seek to work around that directive, and the presence of legal ar-
gument ought to have an impact on the success rate of that work. We 
seek to analyze these formal and behavioral dimensions of constraint 
by considering how legal argument affects the resolution of a dispute 
when the applicable law is either maximally constraining (such as 
under a rule) or minimally constraining (such as under a standard) 
and when there is a risk that the person applying that law will be 
motivated to resist its constraint. 
                                                                                                                  
 32. Brian Sheppard, Judging Under Pressure: A Behavioral Examination of the Rela-
tionship Between Legal Decisionmaking and Time, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 931, 979-83 (2012).
 33. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of 
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1494-95 (2008); Yuval Feldman & 
Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental 
Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81, 87 (2008); Brian Shep-
pard & Fiery Cushman, Evaluating Norms: An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Be-
tween Norm-Content, Operator, and Charitable Behavior, 63 VAND. L. REV. 55, 68-71 (2010).
 34. A summary of this research on the constraint of rules and standards is set forth in 
Brian Sheppard, Calculating the Standard Error: Just How Much Should Empirical Stud-
ies Curb Our Enthusiasm for Legal Standards?, 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 92, 99 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/123/march10/forum_688.php. 
 35. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 58-59 (1992).
 36. We wish to add that even though this adjudication is straightforward, we do not 
endorse it as a correct, best, or right adjudication.
 37. Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 807 (2005). 
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 The interaction between the type of legal norm content under con-
sideration and the presence of legal argumentation has not yet been 
studied empirically. In this Article, we use a modified version of the 
experiment employed in the study that inspired this project to shed 
light on this interaction.   
 Although we discuss our findings in greater detail at the end of 
this Article, the results here draw a clear parallel to the results in that 
previous study. There, the results illustrated that it can be useful to 
conceive of time as a judicial resource, one that can make it easier for 
judges to convince themselves that they can reach results that are at 
odds with the plain dictates of a legal rule.38 Likewise, the results 
here demonstrate circumstances under which legal argument can be 
understood as a judicial resource that can be put into service for the  
same ends. 
 In Part II, we examine the state of existing empirical scholarship 
on the effect of legal argument, explaining how this study makes a 
contribution. Thereafter, in Part III, we detail the mechanics of our 
experiment and our specific hypotheses, which we have derived from 
the existing literature. In Part IV, we discuss the results of the ex-
periment. Finally, in Part V, we analyze the results and briefly con-
sider policy implications and avenues for further study. 
II. THE PROGRESS OF EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP ON THE EFFECT OF 
LEGAL ARGUMENTATION
 In this Part, we will describe the unique methodological challeng-
es that exist for those social scientists who wish to isolate legal ar-
gument’s effect, show how scholars have attempted to bypass those 
problems, and provide alternative approaches that address gaps in 
the literature. As to this final point, we explain how scholars ought to 
be mindful of three important lessons from the literature that inform 
the Legalist/Critical debate, and then we derive a competing model of 
legal argument influence from the literature as well as from the find-
ings in a previous study. 
A.   Methodological Challenges and Attempted Solutions 
 A handful of scholars have begun using the tools of statistical 
analysis to examine the effect of legal argument in specific contexts.39
                                                                                                                  
 38. See Sheppard, supra note 32, at 985-86.
 39. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins Jr., Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court: Investigat-
ing the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 POL. RES. Q. 55 (2007); Susan Brodie Haire et 
al., Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667 (2006); Timothy R. Johnson et al., Oral Advocacy Before 
the United States Supreme Court: Does it Affect the Justices’ Decisions?, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 457 (2007) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Oral Advocacy]; Timothy R. Johnson et al., The 
Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99 (2006) 
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The findings have not been perfectly uniform,40 but they generally 
provide support for the commonplace notion that legal arguments 
make a difference to the judicial determinations to which they per-
tain. We will describe these findings below. 
 One challenge to the empirical study of argument is that it can be 
methodologically difficult to isolate argument’s effect when the object 
of study is actual courts. Legal argument is so ubiquitous among 
courts of law that it is virtually impossible to locate a court with 
available records that has both considered and not considered legal 
argument on the same issue such that adequate comparison of the 
two conditions can be made. Empiricists have found ways to bypass 
this problem, but these methods are not without cost.  
 One approach is to focus on a particular kind of argumentation, 
one that only periodically arises in the same court, such as the filing 
of amicus briefs. Indeed, a considerable portion of extant studies of 
legal argumentation have analyzed whether the presence of amicus 
briefs or a greater number of amicus briefs improves the chances that 
the side for which they were filed will prevail.41
 A cost of taking this approach is that it makes it more likely that 
the findings are of limited application outside of the rather unusual 
manner of argumentation that they directly concern. In the case of 
amicus briefs, the legal arguments provided therein are merely sup-
plements to the primary arguments raised by the parties themselves. 
Moreover, amicus brief cases make up only a small fraction of cases 
before the courts.42 By making them the focus of study, we lose sight 
of what the impact of legal argument as a general matter might be; 
as the study does not tell us whether the primary briefing is having 
an impact. Furthermore, there is the problem of selection bias: ami-
cus briefs are not distributed randomly among the population of cas-
es; rather, parties choose to file amicus briefs for very particular rea-
sons such as ideology, publicity, goodwill, or the likelihood of success 
                                                                                                                  
[hereinafter Johnson et al., Influence]; Timothy R. Johnson, Information, Oral Arguments, 
and Supreme Court Decision Making, 29 AM. POL. RES. 331 (2001) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Information]; Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: 
When and How Do Legal Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
259 (2007); Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 
POL. RES. Q. 505 (1998) [hereinafter McGuire, Explaining Executive Success]; Kevin T. 
McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litiga-
tion Success, 57 J. POLITICS 187, 187-88 (1995) [hereinafter McGuire, Repeat Players].
 40. Compare Johnson, Information, supra note 39 with Collins, supra note 39.
 41. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 39.
 42. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, Assuring Consistency and Uniformity of Precedent and 
Legal Doctrine in the Areas of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Entrusted Exclusively to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A View from the Top, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 705 
(“[A]micus briefs before [U.S. Court of Appeals] panels, even in obviously landmark cases, 
are rather rare.”).
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on the merits.43 Thus, amicus and non-amicus cases might not be suf-
ficiently alike to merit comparison.44
 Another way to bypass the comparison problem is to study the ef-
fect of argument indirectly. For example, a wealth of studies have 
analyzed whether the differences in the personal characteristics of 
the arguers correlate with differences in judicial decisions.45 Because 
the creation and presentation of legal argument is the primary func-
tion that lawyers perform, studies that draw a connection between 
lawyer quality and judicial determinations can provide support for 
the notion that legal argumentation is making a difference.  
 Regardless of how one feels about the adequacy of quantitative 
measures of attorney quality, these studies are not designed to tell us 
whether legal argument, itself, affects legal constraint. Rather, the 
authors’ efforts are primarily directed towards showing that imbal-
ances in representation skill affect judicial decisions, particularly at 
the Supreme Court. To be sure, these studies provide support for the 
notion that good or bad representation is more and less effective, re-
spectively, but this is different from analyzing legal argument gener-
ally in at least two ways. First, it makes it more difficult to disentan-
gle the effect of legal argument from the other effects of legal repre-
sentation, such as the effect caused by lawyer reputation, charisma, 
and the merits of the underlying case itself, to name a few. Secondly, 
the study of the differential effect of good and bad argument is simply 
                                                                                                                  
 43. Ironically, this has been empirically examined as well. See Chris Nicholson & Paul 
M. Collins, Jr., The Solicitor General’s Amicus Curiae Strategies in the Supreme Court, 36 
AM. POL. RES. 382, 382 (2007) (analyzing reasons that Solicitor General files amicus briefs 
and stating, “[w]e find that the SG’s decision to file an amicus brief is influenced by legal, 
political, and administrative considerations, suggesting that the SG is best viewed through 
the incorporation of a variety of theoretical perspectives”).
 44. A similar criticism has been leveled against many studies of attorney quality. See
David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment 
to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1152-53 (2007) (“Because they can-
not establish that case assignment across attorneys was random, they raise serious ques-
tions regarding case selection bias, namely the aforementioned issue that case outcomes 
may reflect the matching between attorney and client, not simply attorney ability. For 
this reason, it is impossible to discern whether the differences in case outcomes are at-
tributable to differences in quality across attorneys or differences in the distribution of 
cases across attorneys.”).
 45. See, e.g., Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career 
Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2005); Haire et al., supra note 39, at 
684; Talia Roitberg Harmon & William S. Lofquist, Too Late for Luck: A Comparison of 
Post-Furman Exonerations and Executions of the Innocent, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 498 (2005); 
Stacia L. Haynie & Kaitlyn L. Sill, Experienced Advocates and Litigation Outcomes: Repeat 
Players in the South African Supreme Court of Appeal, 60 POL. RES. Q. 443, 443-44 (2007); 
Johnson et al., Influence, supra note 39; Johnson, Information, supra note 39; McAtee & 
McGuire, supra note 39; McGuire, Explaining Executive Success, supra note 39, at 522; 
McGuire, Repeat Players, supra note 39; Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who 
Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 235 (1992); John Szmer et al., Does the Lawyer Matter? Influencing Outcomes 
on the Supreme Court of Canada, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 279 (2007).
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a different phenomenon than the effect caused by argument general-
ly. It compares the effects of higher and lower quality argumentation 
rather than the effects of argumentation and the absence thereof. 
Both are worthy objects of study, but the analysis of legal constraint 
would be incomplete without consideration of the latter. 
 There is, however, another way to bypass the comparison problem, 
and while it does come with a cost, it provides better isolation of legal 
argument’s effect than the previous two methodologies: behavioral 
experimentation. With the liberty of designing our own randomized 
case simulations, we can make legal argument an experimental vari-
able while keeping other important dimensions of the case constant, 
such as the judge, facts, and law. In addition, we can introduce other 
variables that allow us to spot an interaction between the type of law 
being interpreted and the presence of legal argument. The vast majori-
ty of studies that examine legal argument effect do not compare its 
impact on different types of law.46 In the following Part, we will explain 
how this could mean that an important interaction is being missed.  
 The downside of the behavioral experimentation approach is that 
it can be costly and can lead to results that lack external validity, 
particularly when simulations are used.47 A simulation is not the real 
world, so it could be argued that the results are not generalizable to 
actual judges.48 There are surely skills and practices that become re-
fined, improved, or otherwise changed as one becomes more experi-
enced in law, and it is possible that such changes might make a dif-
ference to legal argument’s influence. For this reason, this Article 
does not seek to quantify in a universal way, the amount of argument 
influence; rather, it compares how those of roughly equal experience 
respond to legal argument under different conditions. In the method-
ology section, we further describe our efforts to minimize the problem 
of external validity, and we hope that the benefits of effect isolation 
far outweigh the costs to generalizability. 
 The aforementioned statistical analyses of courts have provided a 
number of useful lessons, each of which we have attempted to incor-
porate into experimental design, and we summarize these lessons in 
the following Part. 
                                                                                                                  
 46. One exception is Johnson et al., Influence, supra note 39 (including whether the 
issue is statutory or common law in nature as independent variables).
 47. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 38 (1983) (“However, experimental con-
trol usually comes at the cost of increased artificiality of the research environment. This means 
decreased external validity or generalizability of any observed cause-and-effect relationships.”).
 48. Cf., e.g., K. Anders Ericsson et al., The Making of an Expert, 85 HARV. BUS. REV.
115, 115-21 (2007) (stating “[n]ew research shows that outstanding performance is the 
product of years of deliberate practice and coaching not of any innate talent or skill” and 
finding that leaders can improve abilities through deliberate practice, feedback, and inner 
coaching that continually challenges them).
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B.   Three Lessons from the Empirical Literature on Legal Argument 
 Among the valuable existing literature on the effect of legal ar-
gument, there are three lessons that relate directly to the design of 
this project.  
1.   Judges Are Receptive to the Content of Legal Arguments 
 Paul Collins, Jr., who has authored or co-authored numerous stud-
ies of amicus brief influence, has provided evidence that U.S. Su-
preme Court justices and U.S. Courts of Appeals judges are influ-
enced by the content of amicus briefs.49 Justices are more likely to 
cast conservative or liberal votes in proportion to the number of con-
servative or liberal (respectively) amicus briefs filed.  
With regard to conservative briefs, the results indicate that com-
pared with a case in which a single conservative brief is filed (and 
a single liberal brief), when [ten] conservative briefs are filed (and 
one liberal brief), the most liberal justice in the data . . . is [six per-
cent] more likely to vote conservatively. This increases to about 
[fourteen percent] for the vast majority of the Court . . . and is 
slightly attenuated for the most conservative justices in the sam-
ple . . . who are [twelve percent] more likely to vote conservatively 
in this situation. The results are virtually identical for liberal ami-
cus briefs: the most liberal justice in the data is [six percent] more 
likely to cast a liberal vote as the number of liberal briefs moves 
from [one] to [ten], while the majority of the Court is about [four-
teen percent] more likely [sic] cast a liberal vote.50
In a separate study, Collins and Wendy Martinek found similar re-
sults in the U.S. Court of Appeals. They found that “amicus briefs 
filed in support of the appellant enhance the likelihood of that liti-
gant’s probability of success” although the effect was more one-sided 
than the one observed at the Supreme Court: “amicus briefs filed in 
support of the appellee have no effect on litigation outcomes.”51 The 
one-sidedness is unsurprising, as the Courts of Appeals wield less 
control over their dockets and therefore affirm at a much higher rate. 
As a result, one can expect that the effect of legal argument has more 
room to make a difference on the appellant side of a dispute.  
 Lastly, Professor Pamela Corley analyzed U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions with plagiarism detection software and discovered that 
justices routinely borrow language from the briefs submitted to 
                                                                                                                  
 49. See PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS 
AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (2008).
 50. Id. at 109-10.
 51. See Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Wendy L. Martinek, Friends of the Circuits: Interest 
Group Influence on Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 397, 397 
(2010).
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them.52 While Corley did not analyze whether a positive result of pla-
giarism correlated with a justice’s vote in that case,53 she did observe 
several important patterns. Importantly, she discovered that justices 
were more likely to plagiarize briefs from more experienced attor-
neys, particularly briefs submitted by the solicitor general.54
 But how can we be confident that these studies provide support 
for the notion that the judges are influenced by the merit of the legal 
arguments in the briefs before them? Might they be responding to 
something else, such as the prestige of the filer or some other non- 
meritorious factor?  
 Collins’s study is instructive in this regard. He identified a corre-
lation showing that, generally speaking,55 as the number of amicus 
briefs increase, the judges are more likely to favor the side for which 
they are filed even though that position runs counter to their ideologi-
cal or personal preferences. Because judges follow these briefs against 
personal interest, Collins supposes, they must be convinced by the 
information contained therein rather than by non-meritorious rea-
sons.56 He further notes that this is a better explanation of the data 
than the leading counterposition, drawn from Attitudinalism, that 
justices would ignore the briefs and simply vote their policy prefer-
ences.57 While we cannot be certain that judges who end up voting 
counter-ideologically are persuaded that the legal arguments in the 
briefs state the correct interpretation of the law on point, it is cur-
rently the best explanation available.  
 Lastly, it is worthwhile to add that amicus briefs are supple-
mental briefs often filed in tandem with other briefs for a particular 
dispute. It is possible if not probable that the effect of legal argument 
would be even more pronounced were the object of study the parties’ 
briefs, which the deciding judges would more likely read. 
2.   Judges’ (Ideological) Preferences Matter 
 While the results thus far would seem to support the Legalist po-
sition described in the introduction that law matters, probing deeper 
into the literature provides support for the Critical position.  
 Andrea McAtee and Kevin T. McGuire studied the influence of 
attorney advocacy quality (as measured by, among other things, Jus-
                                                                                                                  
 52. Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties' 
Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468, 468-78 (2008).
 53. See id. at 477 (“[T]his study does not address whether the parties’ briefs influence 
the vote on the merits.”). 
 54. See id. at 476. 
 55. There are two important exceptions that are discussed in the following two subsections.
 56. COLLINS, supra note 49, at 97-98.
 57. See id. For a more in-depth discussion of Attitudinalism, see SEGAL, supra note 16, 
at 221-60. 
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tice Blackmun’s famous oral argument scores58 and the lawyers’ ex-
perience) on the decisions of the Supreme Court.59 They found evi-
dence that the quality of advocacy correlated with the likelihood that 
the justices would choose outcomes in favor of the advocate, but there 
was a critical caveat—the effect was only among cases that were not 
salient.60 Only “[i]n nonsalient cases [did] veteran lawyers of Su-
preme Court advocacy provide an advantage, regardless of whether 
they represent the petitioner or the respondent and regardless of 
whether they are arguing for a liberal or conservative outcome.”61 A 
case becomes “salient” when it has received more than a threshold 
amount of news coverage.62 In light of this definition, it is obvious 
that salience is a proxy for the level of importance that a justice has 
placed on the issue that he or she is resolving. Indeed, McAtee and 
McGuire characterize this important limitation in the same manner: 
Experienced appellate advocacy, therefore, makes a significant 
contribution to the Court's consideration of the legal questions 
that, though they may merit the Court's attention, are not ones  
in which the justices themselves are heavily invested. In cases at 
the forefront of the judicial agenda—cases about whose outcomes  
the justices may care considerably—neither experienced members 
of the Court's legal community nor an impressive appearance be-
fore the justices can regularly persuade the justices to reconsider  
their views.63
Moreover, it would appear that importance includes, to a considera-
ble degree, the ideological relevance of the case. The only independ-
ent variables in McAtee and McGuire’s study that were significant in 
both salient and non-salient cases were those that captured the ideo-
logies of the justices.64 Even more telling, they found that ideology, 
despite being a significant predictor in non-salient cases, carries 
much greater weight in salient cases.65 While it might also be true 
                                                                                                                  
 58. McAtee & McGuire, supra note 39, at 263; see also Johnson et al., Oral Advocacy,
supra note 39, at 460-61 (“In order to do so, we draw on a unique set of data: notes taken 
by former Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun as he sat on the bench during oral ar-
guments. In each case, he took notes that include information perfectly tailored for investi-
gating the role of oral arguments at the Court.”).
 59. McAtee & McGuire, supra note 39, at 259-64. 
 60. See id. at 273-74. 
 61. Id. at 273.
 62. The authors in this section use the same measure for salience—whether the case 
“(1) led to a story on the front page of the [NEW YORK TIMES] on the day after the Court 
handed . . . down [the decision], (2) was the lead . . . case in the story, and (3) was orally 
argued and decided with an opinion.” This methodology was developed by Lee Epstein and 
Jeffrey A. Segal. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 66, 73 (2000).
 63. McAtee & McGuire, supra note 39, at 273 (emphasis added).
 64. Id. at 273-74.
 65. See id. Other empirical scholars have observed this same phenomenon. See Pame-
la C. Corley et al., Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States 
Supreme Court, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 180, 191 (2010) (describing salience as “political salience”); 
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that salient cases tend to be more complex or simply more familiar 
(even in the rare instance that they are not ideological), scholars tend 
to characterize salience in political or ideological terms.66
 The results in other Supreme Court studies are similarly tem-
pered by salience and ideology. Notably, Collins’s findings that amicus 
briefs influence justice votes are also limited to non-salient cases,67 and 
even Corley found that salient cases were less likely to result in pla-
giarism by the justices.68
 It might be tempting to conclude from these findings that ideology 
and legal argument are countervailing forces: the more ideology, the 
less likely will legal argument influence judges. But a closer look at 
Corley’s study shows that the relationship is more complex. Her 
study found that legal argument continues to exert an influence on 
justices in salient cases so long as there is compatibility between the 
direction of the justice’s ideology and the ideological direction of the 
particular legal argument studied. “Overall, the percentage of the 
opinion coming from the briefs is higher if the brief is high quality, if 
brief is ideologically compatible with the Court, and if the case is not 
politically salient.”69 She further found that the variable of ideological 
compatibility had the most predictive power out of all the other varia-
bles she tested (other than whether the solicitor general was the appel-
lant).70 When the justice does not agree ideologically with the result 
proposed in an argument, he or she is less likely to crib its language. 
 A tentative picture of ideological influence on the effect of legal 
argumentation appears from these Supreme Court studies. It would 
seem that when judges care less about the outcome of a case, particu-
larly from an ideological point of view, they are more open to the ar-
guments raised by both sides in a case. When judges care more about a 
case, however, they are more instrumental, considering legal argu-
ment only insofar as doing so serves their previously held preferences. 
 Of course, we ought to be mindful of the possibility that these  
lessons will not apply in a straightforward fashion to other courts. 
The Supreme Court is highly unrepresentative in a number of im-
portant respects, such as availability of resources and the proportion 
                                                                                                                  
Isaac Unah & Ange-Marie Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Case Salience, 
and the Attitudinal Model, 28 LAW & POL’Y 295, 307-09 (2006).
 66. See Paul M. Collins, Jr., The Consistency of Judicial Choice, 70 J. POL. 861, 868-69 
(2008) (concluding that “ideology plays a central role in salient cases” and that, “[c]ontrary 
to expectations . . . the justices’ decision making is not especially unstable in complex cas-
es”); Unah & Hancock, supra note 65 (providing empirical evidence that judicial ideology is 
a stronger predictor of outcomes in highly salient cases). 
 67. Collins, supra note 39, at 60.
 68. Corley, supra note 52, at 4, 7-8.
 69. Id. at 7.
 70. Id. at 8-10.
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of indeterminate legal issues.71 Still, this lesson ought to guide the 
formation of hypotheses for other judicial contexts. 
3.   Judges’ Capacities Are Limited, Which Affects the Influence of 
Legal Argument 
  While Collins found evidence that, for non-salient cases, an in-
crease in the quantity of argumentation simply adds to the persua-
siveness of the position for which they advocate, he also found evi-
dence that that relation only holds true to a point: eventually the 
number of amicus briefs will grow high enough to create decisional 
uncertainty, causing greater variance in judges’ votes.72 Collins also 
discovered evidence that the higher the number of amicus briefs filed, 
the more likely a justice will choose to write separately or to join an 
opinion other than the opinion of the Court.73
 Collins contends that these results are best explained by a theory of 
information overload.74 Judges are receptive to the arguments in ami-
cus briefs, but their decisionmaking becomes unpredictable when the 
number of arguments becomes too high for the judges to comprehend.  
 There are other explanations, however. Udi Sommer points out that  
[i]n fact the function of briefs may be to eschew obfuscation and 
clarify what used to be convoluted issues for the justices. . . . [T]he 
final behavioral effect might be similar—thinking more clearly 
about a case, justices might realize, for example, that the ques-
tions it presents involve four rather than just two policy dimen-
sions. This may result in a greater number of separate opinions or 
more variance in decisionmaking.75
Under either explanation, the judge’s reliance on the briefs takes 
them to a new deliberative place, one that the judge would not likely 
have reached on her own. 
C.   Synthesizing the Lessons for a Study of the Effect of  
Legal Argument 
 In this Part, we combine the empirical lessons and then use the 
composite to create new competing models of legal argument effect 
that incorporate the impact of rules and standards. 
                                                                                                                  
 71. The Court is highly unrepresentative of trial court practice and of alternative 
dispute resolution. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge 
Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83 (2008).
 72. COLLINS, supra note 49, at 115-37.
 73. Id. at 163-64.
 74. Id. at 176-77.
 75. Udi Sommer, Book Review, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 943, 945 (2009) (reviewing  
PAUL M. COLLINS, FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL 
DECISION MAKING (2008)).
2013]          FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT 555
1.   Attempting Synthesis 
 Considering these lessons together, we can make a more accurate 
characterization of how legal argument affects judicial decisionmak-
ing: judges conceive of legal arguments as tools for their own use. 
Like tools, legal arguments tend to be used only when the user feels 
that the tool will enhance performance. Otherwise, the cost of drag-
ging oneself out to the shed to rummage through multiple toolboxes, 
or in the judge’s case, slogging carefully through a brief, does not 
seem worthwhile. Thus, a judge who feels she is able to handle a case 
based solely upon her own understanding of the issue before expo-
sure to the argument is less likely to consider and be influenced by 
the legal arguments presented to her. This is most likely to occur 
when the case presents an issue that connects with a familiar ideo-
logical topic. Similarly, a judge that feels the arguments are not like-
ly to be sophisticated enough to instruct her on the nuances of a com-
plex case is less likely to consider them. On the other hand, a judge is 
more likely to consider and be influenced by legal arguments on is-
sues with which the judge is unfamiliar or upon which the judge has 
yet to make a considered judgment. 
 Secondly, despite a judge’s conclusion that legal argument is likely 
to enhance her decisionmaking, it is possible that legal argument 
could make her decision uncharacteristic. She might become over-
whelmed by the overload of information to which she has chosen to 
expose herself and begin to deliberate in unpredictable ways. Just as 
the careless carpenter can get too ambitious in her use of tools in DIY 
projects thereby causing calamity, a judge can expose herself to too 
many arguments and make an uncharacteristic decision. The take 
home point for the purposes of this Article is somewhat simpler: 
Judges are human—they sometimes want assistance, they can make 
errors, and they can learn new things. 
 Recall that the difference as to the constraining power of law is an 
important factor in explaining the differences between Legalist and 
Critical views of legal argument’s effect. Now that we have reason to 
conceptualize legal argument as a tool for a motivated judge, we have 
a better sense of how legal constraint operates in our model. For a 
judge that is motivated to reach a particular outcome, the presence or 
absence of a constraining legal directive will make the judge’s path to 
that preferred outcome more or less difficult, respectively. Existing 
studies have not considered how the status of a law as a rule or a 
standard will affect the impact of legal argument on decisionmaking.  
 Moreover, we have drawn our lessons largely from research of  
the U.S. Supreme Court, which controls its own docket and takes 
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atypically complex, open, and ideologically fraught cases.76 On the 
one hand, these factors should make legal argument a less valuable 
tool than in the typical case, which is much more legally straightfor-
ward, time-constrained, ideologically less salient and/or familiar.77
On the other hand, judges in typical cases often get repeat issues 
with which they are quite familiar, which could itself dampen the 
effect of argument. Thus, there are reasons to wonder about whether 
the results of Supreme Court argument studies are generalizable to 
the larger realm of typical cases, thus making room for further study. 
We will revisit this issue in Part IV. 
2.   New Alternative Models 
 Without empirical guidance on this question, we remain saddled 
with the aforementioned competing models of legal argument effect.  
 Legalists, who believe that correct or best legal answers are readi-
ly discoverable with reasonable effort and that judges will be com-
pelled to decide in accordance with those answers,78 would likely con-
tend as follows: in the typically straightforward case governed by a 
rule, the judge’s decision would not be as impacted by the presence of 
legal argument as it would be if the same case were governed by a 
standard. The rule, with little else, should be sufficient to provide the 
correct answer, and that answer will dictate the judge’s decision in 
the case.79 Under standards, the judge will likely see the legal di-
rective as open-ended, leading her to believe that the work necessary 
for discovering the best legal answer will be more challenging and 
wide-ranging than under rules.80 As a result, the diligent judge will be 
more receptive to the claims raised by the parties who offer different 
vantage points on the fit, justification, and/or ramifications of the law. 
 The Critical view can be quite different. Those Critics who believe 
that the correct legal answer is either undiscoverable or will not 
compel the judge to change her decisionmaking, such as extreme  
Attitudinalists, would have to argue that, regardless of the law’s  
content, legal argument in the typical case would have the same  
effect—almost nothing.81 The judge under either a rule or a standard 
                                                                                                                  
 76. See Lazarus, supra note 26, at 1507-09. 
 77. See id.
 78. See supra Part I. 
 79. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 621-22 (1992).
 80. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 220 (1986).  
 81. It is, of course, possible that lawyers would raise arguments designed to change 
judges’ ideological or personal preferences or to inform them of ways that outcomes might 
relate to those preferences. For example, a lawyer might try to convince a judge that this is 
one of those exceptional situations in which a real libertarian would vote to uphold a law 
that appears to be restricting individuals’ choices. Such arguments are rare, however, per-
haps because they are frowned upon as legally invalid, because judges’ preferences are 
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would simply favor the legal arguments for the side on which her 
ideological or personal preferences lie. Though the judge might use 
arguments to save time and effort, she will not use it for the sake of 
making and following an objective appraisal of the law’s dictates. 
Therefore, argument will not change the likelihood that the judge 
will reach an outcome that is at odds with what she would prefer in 
the absence of law. In short, because the law fails to constrain as a 
general matter, the presence of argument will almost never increase 
the likelihood that constraint will occur regardless of whether the 
operative law is a rule or a standard.  
 Fortunately, existing empirical work, including our work in previ-
ous studies, provides a third option. On the one hand, our first lesson 
tells us that we ought to credit the Legalist belief that the content of 
legal arguments often impacts the judge’s deliberation in predictable 
ways. On the other hand, the second lesson tells us that judges some-
times view argument through the lens of their ideological or personal 
preferences, so we have reason to credit the Critical belief that legal 
argument will be put into service of the judge’s ideological agenda. 
Lastly, in light of the third lesson, we must remind ourselves that 
judges are human and have limited capacities, and legal arguments 
can serve as tools that augment those capacities.  
 Regarding this last point, our previous study showed us that 
rules, unlike standards, have the power to stress the judge’s percep-
tion that she will have the capacity to reach a legally convincing re-
sult that is consistent with her own ideology or personal prefer-
ences.82 Rules have the unique power to provide straightforward di-
rectives that are at odds with what the judge would think is the right 
or best outcome, all things considered. Judges, however, possess the 
countervailing capacity to reach their preferred outcomes despite the 
rule’s command. They do this through engaging in “work,” a some-
times painstaking interpretive enterprise.83 Because work is difficult, 
judicial resources are important. Sometimes the judge will cave in to 
the rule’s command because she does not have the time or energy to 
successfully complete her work. We can theorize that legal argument 
impacts judicial decisionmaking by increasing the success rate of 
work; it can ease the judge’s burden by providing ready-made justifi-
cations or useful information.  
 Combining these three features, a new, more complex model (the 
“Combined Empirical Model”) emerges: judges that are subject to 
rules that they perceive as calling for a result that conflicts with 
                                                                                                                  
typically static, or because judges are usually aware of the personal or ideological implica-
tions of their votes in the absence of argument. Nevertheless, the Attitudinalist might con-
cede that such arguments could make a difference. I owe Carl Coleman for this point.
 82. See Sheppard, supra note 32, at 957-60.
 83. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) 166-68 (1997).
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their ideological or personal preferences will be more likely to consid-
er the content of legal arguments than if they were under a standard 
because they are more in need of a tool to legally justify their ideolog-
ically or personally preferred result. When the judge perceives that 
the arguments provided on that side of the issue are valuable—and 
this is a determination that will likely also consider the relative val-
ue of the opposing argumentation—the presence of those arguments 
should make it easier for the judge to craft a satisfactory justification 
for their preferred position.   
 In Table 1, we show how these various positions describe the effect 
of legal argument. 
Table 1: Competing Models of Legal Argument Impact under Rules 
and Standards 
Philosophical Position Rules84 Standards 
Legalism LESS MORE 
Attitudinalism SAME SAME 
Combined Empirical  MORE LESS 
 Because it utilizes the most recent research on the subject, our par-
ticular hypotheses will be drawn from the Combined Empirical Model.  
 These hypotheses will need more flesh than the rather barebones 
information given thus far, but further detail cannot easily be added 
without first describing the instrument that we used to test which of 
the competing models receives empirical support.  
 Before doing so, we return briefly to the methodological issues 
that began this Part. As discussed, the popular solutions to the com-
parison problem are not well-suited to a study of the differential im-
pact of legal argument on rules and standards. To test this directly, 
we need to hold the facts of the case constant while varying whether 
legal argument is present and whether a rule or a standard applies to 
that case. Furthermore, it would be best to have a way to monitor 
both the direction and strength of ideological passion in the precise 
case being considered. Experimental simulation can provide uniformi-
ty of legal norms, case facts, judicial motivation, legal precedent, and 
party argumentation that is elusive in actual legal systems. This will 
                                                                                                                  
 84. This assumes constraining, rather than assisting, rules. See Sheppard, supra note 32.
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allow the best possible isolation of the interaction between legal argu-
ment and type of legal norm content. And while it is not perfect—this 
is a simulation, after all—steps can be taken to increase the likelihood 
that the findings of the lab are valid externally as well. We will de-
scribe those measures in the following Part. 
III.   TESTING METHODS AND HYPOTHESES
A.   Experimental Design 
 The experiment at the center of this study is a modified design of 
the experiment implemented in our last study, a 2x2 (argument/no 
argument and rule/standard).85 Thus, many of its characteristics 
have already been validated. For example, the fact pattern, incen-
tives structure, and many of the variables are nearly identical. This 
similarity allows for greater internal validity, as the instrument has 
already been tested, and allows for an analysis of reliability. 
1.   Participants and Design 
 This experiment asked law students and law school graduates 
from the last two years to serve as mock judges in a simulated case. 
It was important for the fact pattern to be ideologically salient and 
divisive so that subjects would care about the result and so that sub-
jects on one side of the ideological divide would feel pressure not to 
apply the law in a straightforward direction.86 In other words, the 
experiment was designed to set up the conditions for legal constraint.
We wanted to test whether law makes a difference when the deci-
sionmaker would prefer it not to. The fact pattern read as follows: 
A citizen of a foreign nation (“the alien”) has legally entered our 
country on August 1, 2007 with a valid 1-year work visa issued 
that same day. He fled his home country after being persecuted for 
his activism on behalf of the poor and his anti-establishment polit-
ical opinion. He had been imprisoned for his political protests 
briefly in 2006, and he and his family had been threatened by the 
local police force. Worried for his personal safety, he obtained the 
visa and arrived here. He could not speak English and was largely 
ignorant of our laws regarding asylum, which is the mechanism 
our country uses to allow aliens to reside here who have been or 
fear being persecuted on account of their race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a social group, or political opinion. He began  
working in a restaurant shortly after his arrival, but his employer 
                                                                                                                  
 85. Sheppard, supra note 32, at 966.
 86. See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS & PEW HISPANIC CTR.,
NO CONSENSUS ON IMMIGRATION PROBLEM OR PROPOSED FIXES: AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION 
QUANDRY 9 (2006), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/63.pdf (showing 
roughly even distribution nationally of those that believe immigration is a very big prob-
lem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, and not a problem at all).
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never asked him to show documentation indicating that he was a 
legal worker. He was paid under-the-table. On July 31, 2008, his 
visa expired. He continued to work at the restaurant, however, re-
ceiving pay as usual for the next 13 months. At that point, a new 
employee began work at the same restaurant. The new employee 
soon learned of the alien’s experiences in his home country and of 
his expired one-year visa. The new employee explained to the alien 
that staying here after the expiration of the visa was illegal but 
that he might qualify for asylum on the ground of past persecution 
for political opinion. She suggested that the alien file a petition for 
asylum. The alien retained a lawyer and filed a petition about 4 
weeks later on September 25, 2009. If granted asylum, the alien 
will have the legal right to live here indefinitely. If denied asylum, 
he will be removed from our country and transported back to the 
country of his citizenship. 
This fact pattern was a constant in the experiment, appearing every 
time subjects were asked to engage in a decision as to the merits of  
the case.   
 The other noteworthy constant in the design is the incentives 
structure. In an effort to make the judging scenario mimic real life, 
there are two important motivations that must be tapped into: (1) 
the motivation to write a convincing justification for a decision; and 
(2) the motivation to reach the result that you personally favor. The 
first is often felt by judges as pressure to make their decisionmaking 
conform to extant binding legal authority. The second is a moral, so-
cial, personal, or ideological pressure to make sure that the conse-
quences of the decision are consistent with the values of the respec-
tive normative system. 
 As for the motivation to follow the law, the main challenge was to 
get subjects to feel bound by the simulated law and to feel compelled 
to make a concerted effort in applying it and justifying their applica-
tion. To meet this challenge, subjects were told that they would have 
the opportunity to be entered in a contingent lottery. The contingency 
was as follows: if subjects can convince one of two colleagues that the 
subjects have adequately justified their result, they are eligible to 
win a random drawing with a $300 prize. Subjects were told to write 
only until they felt that they have written a convincing justification. 
This served to increase the likelihood that students were motivated to 
put in effort and seek to write a decision that meets the demands of  
actual judging.  
 As for the motivation to bring about consequences that they care 
about, the biggest challenge was to get the subjects to feel as though 
their decisions had actual stakes—no small feat in a fake case. To 
meet this challenge, we told subjects that their decision would result 
in the payment of $75 to actual charitable organizations whose  
mission was consistent with the result they choose if they won the 
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lottery.87 More specifically, we told them that a decision to grant asy-
lum would result in payment to Grantmakers Concerned with Immi-
grants and Refugees, a non-profit and pro-immigration organiza-
tion.88 On the other hand, a decision to deny asylum would result in a 
payment to the Federation for American Immigration Reform, a non-
profit organization that is critical of current immigration policies.89
While these stakes are lower than if this case described a real immi-
gration hearing, they are large enough for students to care about the 
real-world consequences of the decision that they are asked to render 
and therefore make the experiment more representative of actual 
judging.90 In effect, these measures tie fictional outcomes to the ad-
vancement of real world ideologies. 
 Having discussed what remains constant between conditions, it is 
now time to turn to what changes. The most important change that 
occurs during the treatment (or “law”) phase is that the fact pattern 
is supplemented with either law or law and argument. 
 Thus, the experiment had three variables and two observation pe-
riods. The two main variables were exposures to law and exposure to 
argumentation. Each subject completed two phases, which were in 
random order and both of which were completed online during the 
same session. The phases are distinguished by whether subjects were 
exposed to a potentially dispositive law; in one phase they were (the 
“law phase”) and in the other they were not (the “baseline phase”). 
All subjects receive the same baseline condition—the aforementioned 
immigration fact pattern presenting a choice of whether to grant or 
deny asylum—but we randomized the order in which subjects were 
exposed to the two phases.91 The two-phase design isolates legal  
effect by allowing us to compare a subject’s decisionmaking when  
                                                                                                                  
 87. Note that this is a slight difference with our previous study in which subjects sent 
$2 to each organization regardless of whether they won the lottery. This was a cheaper way 
to set the incentive, and it was easier for the subjects to understand, as it follows the same 
mechanism as the prize for convincingness.
 88. GRANTMAKERS CONCERNED WITH IMMIGRANTS & REFUGEES, http://www.gcir.org/about 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
 89. FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageNavigator/about/ 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2013). 
 90. Indeed, in a pilot, one subject refused to take part because he did not want to sup-
port an organization that he or she felt an ideological objection towards and the law would 
have, in his view, forced him or her to do so.
 91.   In the empirical literature, a condition labeled “baseline” would ordinarily occur 
before the treatment for each subject. See, e.g., MOSBY’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (8th ed. 
2009) (defining baseline condition as “an environmental condition during which a particu-
lar behavior reflects a stable rate of response before the introduction of experimental or 
therapeutic conditions”). For our purposes in this Article, the label is appropriate because 
it captures the fact that our baseline measure is meant to reveal the stable preferences of 
the subjects in the absence of the experimental condition. See ANNE MYERS & CHRISTINE H.
HANSEN, EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (7th ed. 2012) (defining baseline as “a measure of 
behavior as it normally occurs without the experimental manipulation; a control condition 
used to assess the impact of the experimental condition.”). 
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potentially dispositive law is present and when it is absent in the 
same case. Thus, this dimension of the experiment employs a “within  
subjects” design.  
 The law phase of the experiment further permits “between sub-
jects” analysis; it allows for comparisons between different subject 
groups that have been divided along a handful of randomized exper-
imental conditions. There were two experimental treatments, one 
comprising a pure law condition and another comprising a legal con-
dition and a legal argument. The pure law treatment consisted of two 
factors: subjects received either a pure rule or a pure standard. The 
argument treatment also had two factors: subjects received a series 
of legal arguments in conjunction with either a pure rule or standard. 
Thus, the experiment has a factorial 2x2(x2) design92 as shown in  
Table 2. 
Table 2: 2x2(x2) Design of Experiment’s Legal Norm and  
Argument Exposure 
Rule  Standard 
Rule + Argument Standard + Argument 
Thus, there were four experimental conditions in all, which represent 
the four possible combinations under the two treatments: pure legal 
norms (either rule or standard) and law plus argument (either rule 
plus argument or standard plus argument). Using this approach, it 
was possible to isolate the effect of the presence of argument on rules 
and on standards.  
 The random order variable deserves additional mention, although 
it is not something that figures prominently in this particular study: 
order was randomized. Thus, some subjects received the baseline 
phase first and others received the law phase first. In a separate 
study, we will focus on how the order in which one is exposed to a  
                                                                                                                  
 92. As a technical matter, the experiment is a 2x2(x2) with the last variable as order 
of exposure: some subjects received the baseline phase first and others received the law 
phase first. Because order is a covariate, however, we will refer to the experiment as a 2x2.
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legal issue affects decisionmaking and ideology or personal prefer-
ence. Because we expect that order will affect decisionmaking, we will 
report some results for subjects in both the normal order (baseline 
first) and in reverse order (law first). 
2.   The Independent Variables in Detail 
 It is important for a study that considers the differential effect of 
rules and standards to make every effort to have the norms used in 
the simulation be pure, paradigmatic representations of each type, 
which involves controlling for outside effects of related laws, and that 
they regulate the same conduct.93 Both aspects are satisfied here. In 
addition, we supplement rules or standards with argument for half of 
the subject groups, and the format of the arguments requires a bit of 
discussion. In the following Part, we detail each variable. 
 The Legal Rule: As discussed, the paradigm example of a legal 
rule commands compliance with a bright-line term. In our study, the 
judge is subject to a mandatory bright-line legal rule that is repre-
sentative of actual legal norms of that sort in the real world. In par-
ticular, it provides a specific time deadline for filing asylum applica-
tions after the expiration of the visa, which the immigrant has not 
met. A plain reading of the rule would permit a simple deductive  
solution—namely, all successful applications for asylum must file 
before the deadline, the immigrant here did not file before the dead-
line, and therefore he is not a successful applicant. Other outcomes 
would more difficult to reach, so the resource restriction described 
below should prevent some subjects from reaching other outcomes. 
That is, it should take work to get to a different outcome. 
 The Legal Standard: As discussed, the paradigm legal standard 
conditions compliance upon an evaluative term.94 Accordingly, the 
subject under a legal standard is subject to a law that requires immi-
grants to file asylum applications within a reasonable time after the 
expiration of the visa. Unlike the rule, it does not permit a simple 
deductive solution, and the lack of clarity should make it easy for the 
subject to reach the outcome that he or she prefers, which ought to be 
the same one that he or she chose or will choose in the baseline phase. 
The subject should be able to reach the same outcome as in the base-
line phase regardless of the resource restriction described below. 
                                                                                                                  
 93. Scholars believe that any individual law can be placed somewhere on a continuum 
between the constraining pole of pure rules and the discretionary pole of pure standards. 
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Dis-
course, 97 COLUM L. REV. 1, 49 (1997). Therefore, many laws fall somewhere between these 
poles, and their precise position can be debated. Thus, anyone attempting to test the con-
straining power of rules must endeavor to use pure or polar examples of rules, or else they 
risk the accusation that they have stacked the deck so as to limit their maximum power  
to constrain.    
 94. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381-82 (1985).
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The Legal Argument: The inspiration for the design of the legal 
argument variable was Wilson Huhn’s THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL
ARGUMENT. The book, a very popular textbook designed for instruc-
tion of new law students, is a perfect fit for an experiment of this type 
because it contains one of the clearest and most concise typologies of 
legal argument, because it makes claims about the circumstances 
under which each argument type ought to be most persuasive, and 
because it is the most familiar approach to legal argument for law 
students, who make up the subjects of my experiment.95 Below, we 
provide Huhn’s types as well as our examples of each for each side of  
the argument. 
PRECEDENT 
Pro-Asylum: In Ef v. Gov (2001), the federal appeals court 
upheld the acceptance of a prisoner's brief even though it 
was filed eight months after the deadline because the pris-
oner was representing himself without a lawyer and because 
the denial would have resulted in the serious consequence of  
life imprisonment. 
Anti-Asylum: In Cee v. Bee (2001), the federal appeals court 
upheld the lower court's dismissal of a complaint arising out 
of a slip and fall at a government facility. The complaint was 
filed eight months after the lapse of the statute of limita-
tions period due to the plaintiff's ignorance of the deadline. 
TRADITION 
Pro-Asylum: Traditionally, we have given courts the discre-
tion to rely on equitable principles when the cold, straight-
forward application of the law would bring about unjust con-
sequences, like forcing someone into political persecution or 
risk of death. 
Anti-Asylum: Traditionally, countries have not allowed for-
eign visitors to remain when they have tried to hide from 
the government while within their borders. This is particu-
larly true when the person hiding has decided to accept ben-
efits that the country provides without paying the costs that 
they would have paid if they weren't hiding. 
                                                                                                                  
 95. See HUHN, supra note 4; see also Wilson R. Huhn Receives the 2012 Scholar of  
the Year Award, UAKRON.EDU (May 22, 2012), http://www.uakron.edu/law/news/ 
news-details.dot?newsId=cbc695ef-15de-4128-88c6-065ac27042e1.
2013]          FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT 565
TEXT 
Pro-Asylum: The text of the document does not specify a 
penalty, leaving to the judge discretion to choose an appro-
priate one, which is to grant asylum despite the lateness. 
Anti-Asylum: Following the text of the asylum filing law, the 
outcome here is clear: the alien ought to be denied asylum 
for missing the deadline. 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Pro-Asylum: We can infer that the legislature introduced 
this deadline to ensure that the evidence in favor of or 
against granting asylum does not grow stale. The asylum 
law itself was created out of concerns for basic human fair-
ness, not to disproportionately penalize. 
Anti-Asylum: We can infer that, by introducing this law, the 
legislature intended to curb the number of aliens that have 
abused the system by staying in the country for as long as 
they want before facing the scrutiny of the courts. 
PUBLIC POLICY 
Pro-Asylum: The periods of greatest economic growth in this 
country coincide with periods of open immigration. Here, 
denying asylum in cases like this robs us of productive 
workers; whereas granting asylum allows us to monitor and 
tax more people. 
Anti-Asylum: Allowing aliens to escape legal scrutiny indef-
initely by not imposing strict deadlines for filing allows 
them to occupy jobs that legal aliens or citizens could have. 
As a result, respect for law goes down and unemployment  
goes up.      
Offering an array of arguments serves multiple purposes. First, it 
allows us to increase the validity of the simulation. In actual cases, 
litigants raise numerous arguments, and typically these arguments 
fall into several types. Second, it permits us to test which argument 
type is most persuasive under different circumstances. While this 
was not our focus here, future projects could rely on this testing in-
strument and arrive at novel findings regarding the best fit between 
argument type and case type.  
 It might be wondered why the arguments are evenly paired. We 
considered presenting arguments for only one side or having more 
arguments for one side or the other. Such a design would make this 
project align more closely to existing studies of amicus brief influ-
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ence, in which authors found that more amicus arguments for one 
side made judges more likely to favor that side or with studies of the 
influence of attorney quality.96 In the end, however, we resisted doing 
so for a few reasons. First, this study is designed to shed light, not 
only on the question of how legal argument influences decisionmak-
ing, but also on the more fundamental question of whether it influ-
ences decisionmaking at all. Were we to make the argument on one 
side considerably more sophisticated than the other, we would argu-
ably be stacking the deck in favor of bringing about legal influence in 
that direction, thus minimizing the impact of finding influence. Sec-
ondly, the introduction of yet another variable into the experiment 
would have made the number of subjects necessary to obtain power 
far too high. Thirdly, obviously unbalanced argumentation could 
harm external validity. Subjects might perceive the unbalance as 
something of a game hint—that is, they might conclude that the ob-
vious difference in quality is a signal that they are supposed to find 
for the side with superior argumentation to win the prize. According-
ly, we chose to make the arguments evenly matched. Lastly, we can 
still see whether judges are crediting counter-ideological arguments 
even without unbalanced argumentation. 
3.   The Dependent Variables 
 Simply put, the dependent variables attempt to capture important 
aspects of decisionmaking in the presence of law and in its absence.  
 In both the baseline and law phases of the experiment, the sub-
jects review the fact pattern. Thereafter, the subjects are asked a se-
ries of questions from which we collected data. First, they were asked 
to decide whether or not to grant asylum (although, as described be-
low, the role the subject plays is different between phases). This var-
iable will be called “baseline decision” for the baseline phase or “law 
decision” for the law phase. This allows us to know the outcome of the 
case that they favor under the conditions that they have been ex-
posed to. Having made their choice as to the correct outcome in their 
baseline or law decisions, they were asked to note the strength of 
their conviction that their answer was right on a numbered, 1-10 
Likert Scale.97 This score will be called “baseline satisfaction” or “law 
satisfaction” depending on the phase. Lastly, they were asked to 
                                                                                                                  
 96. See COLLINS, supra note 49, at 109-10. 
 97. A Likert scale is a psychometric scale often used in questionnaires, presenting 
examinees with ordinal choices (for example, a 1-7 scale paired with a statement, 1 mean-
ing total disagreement and 7 meaning total agreement). See ROBERT M. LAWLESS,
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 172 (2010); see, 
e.g., Maya Israel & Andrew Moshirnia, Interacting and Learning Together: Factors Influ-
encing Preservice Teachers’ Perceptions of Academic Wiki Use, 20 J. TECH. & TCHR. EDUC.
151, 160 (2012). 
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write a justification for their decision. The justification allows the 
subjects to work out their decision, forcing the subjects to deliberate 
and consider their incentives and thereby making the experiment 
more valid. Thus, the duplicated variables are the subjects’ decisions 
and their levels of satisfaction.98
B.   Hypotheses 
 Now that that basic mechanics of the experiment are clear, it is 
possible to articulate our specific hypotheses. There are certainly 
more hypotheses than those included below, but these address  
the primary indicators of legal constraint and its relationship with  
legal argumentation.  
 Before beginning, it is important to restate what we mean by 
“constraint.” Constraint occurs when a judge follows the law’s di-
rective despite the fact that, in the absence of law, the judge would 
have chosen differently.99 Because legal constraint is an important 
factor in the model of legal argument effect, we chose to design the 
legal directive so as to maximize the likelihood that they would point 
in a direction that conflicts with what subjects would chose in the 
baseline phase. In short, the rule straightforwardly points towards 
denying asylum.100 Thus, when we refer to “constrainable” subjects, 
we mean those that chose to grant asylum in the baseline phase.   
 As a threshold matter, we tested basic hypotheses regarding the 
differential effect of rules and standards on legal constraint.101
Hypothesis 1: Subjects who receive rules will be more con-
strained (higher decision change rates and lower satisfaction 
scores) than subjects who receive standards. 
                                                                                                                  
 98. In addition, at the end of the law phase, subjects were also asked to prioritize the 
persuasiveness of each of the arguments provided by the parties, indicating by ordinal rank 
the order of priority. Subjects were first asked to rank the persuasiveness of each argument 
in support of the position they advanced in their judicial decisions. Thereafter, they were 
asked to rank the persuasiveness of the arguments against their positions. We included the 
rank dependent variable in anticipation that we would be able to use the results in a sepa-
rate study on the effects of various kinds of legal argument. Since that project is ongoing 
and it is not our focus here, we do not discuss those results in this Article.
 99. See Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official 
Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769, 779 (2010) (describing constraint in similar terms).  
 100. Just because this is the most straightforward interpretation of the rule does not 
mean that it is the legally correct interpretation, of course. We wish to avoid staking a 
position in the debate about whether law admits of single, legally correct answers in the 
majority of cases.
 101. These hypotheses generally concerned the likelihood that the presence of law 
would force subjects to depart from the position they adopted in the baseline phase, and 
the likelihood that these same factors would change strengths of conviction.
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A handful of scholars have tested the differential effects of rules and 
standards and found evidence that rules are more constraining.102 Our 
first goal is to test whether this experiment duplicates those results. 
Hypothesis 2: The higher a subject’s satisfaction in the baseline 
phase the less likely the subject will have chosen differently 
between the two phases. 
The strength of baseline satisfaction is a key component both of 
whether legal constraint will occur and whether legal argument is 
likely to have an impact. In both cases, we predict that the strength 
of ideological or personal preferences (as measured by baseline satis-
faction) will work against the likelihood that law will constrain. In 
the case of legal argument, strength is doubly important: because we 
expect that, in the typical case, the judge will view legal argument as 
a useful tool for engaging in work, those that have strong ideological 
or personal desires to engage in work will likewise be more likely to 
use legal argument to enhance their ability to complete work. 
Hypothesis 3: Subjects who receive argument will show lower 
constraint scores (lower decision change rates, higher law 
confidence) than subjects who receive no argument.
Because arguments are tools that help judges as they engage in 
work, we can expect that the judges will be less constrained under 
the argument condition overall. This effect, however, ought to be 
much more pronounced under the rule condition because we do not 
expect a significant effect under the standard condition, which is the 
hypothesis that follows. 
Hypothesis 4: There will be significantly fewer constrained 
subjects under the argument and rule condition than under 
the rule condition, and there will not be a significant differ-
ence in the number of constrained subjects between the ar-
gument and standard condition and the standard condition. 
This reflects the Combined Empirical Model, which characterizes le-
gal arguments as tools to make work easier for the ideologically or 
personally motivated judge, but which respects the fact that work is 
made more or less difficult by the constraining power of the norm 
content in the law.  
IV.   RESULTS
 A total of 217 subjects (N = 217) successfully completed the exper-
iment. The subjects represented every year of law school (first, second, 
                                                                                                                  
 102. See Cox & Miles, supra note 33, at 1494; Feldman & Harel, supra note 33, at 87; 
Sheppard & Cushman, supra note 33, at 80; Sheppard, supra note 32, at 980. 
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and third year students) as well as graduates from up to two years 
prior. Statistical analysis of difference scores on our two primary de-
pendent variables (decision and satisfaction) did not show any signif-
icant difference between graduates and law students. 
 Before discussing the results it is necessary to briefly mention two 
aspects of the testing instrument that performed unexpectedly. First, 
for unknown reasons, no data was collected for strength of conviction 
during the baseline phase for one of the eight subgroups. This re-
duced the power of the experiment as it related to within subjects 
comparisons, but the main effects of the variables were pronounced 
enough to overcome that hurdle. Second, the randomizing function 
did not create evenly sized groups; this contributed to a lack of uni-
formity on the baseline decision means among the groups.103 As a re-
sult, the following analysis also includes difference scores for decision 
rather than simple means for decisions for each group. 
 The following table (Table 3) sets forth the basic descriptive statis-
tics, which will be discussed with particularity below. 
                                                                                                                  
 103. The four groups (Rule, Standard, Rule Argument, and Standard Argument) exhib-
ited significantly different baseline decision refusal rates (6%, 21%, 21%, and 2%, respec-
tively) before exposure to any variables indicating that randomization did not ensure 
equalized groups. We ran a 3X3 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with type of 
law, exposure to argument, and order as the independent variables, and with baseline de-
cision and baseline conviction as the dependent variables. The multivariate test returned a 
significant result for argument’s effect on baseline decision F (1, 209) = 2.88, p = .091. 
However, these subjects had not yet been exposed to argument. To determine if the normal 
order groups were significantly different before exposure to experimental conditions, we 
ran a post hoc comparison of only the normal order groups. This test used the Sidak correc-
tion to control for type I error. See Herve Abdi, The Bonferonni and Sidak Corrections of 
Multiple Comparisons, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEASUREMENT AND STATISTICS (Neil 
Salkind ed., 2007). The pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference in the moral 
decision between several of the groups. The Standard Argument group (m = 1.02, SE = .05) 
was significantly different from the Standard Only group (m = 1.21, SE = .05, p = .01) and 
the Rule Argument group (m = – 1.21, SE = .06, p = .02). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Summary 
Treatment N Baseline 
Phase  
Denial Rate 
&
Conviction
(Std. Dev.) 
Law Phase 
Denial Rate 
&
Conviction
(Std. Dev.)
Change (Law 
Phase Minus 
Baseline) 
Standard 59 22% 
7.63 
(1.75)
32% 
7.63 
(1.71)
10% 
.00 
Standard 
&
Argument
69 9%
7.82 
(1.50)
20% 
7.60 
(1.84)
11% 
.22 
Rule 43 16% 
7.17 
(2.06)
51% 
6.77 
(2.32)
35% 
.40 
Rule  
&
Argument 
46104 13% 
7.86 
(1.50)
22% 
6.89 
(2.22)
9%
.63 
 We then ran a 3x3 Manova, with type of law, exposure to argu-
ment, and order as the independent variables, and with the differ-
ence score for decisions (baseline decision – law decision), law deci-
sion, and law satisfaction as the dependent variables. 
 The multivariate test returned significant results for all three var-
iables, as well as all interactions except between type of legal norm 
content (rule or standard) and order. Due to the significant multi-
variate test results, between subjects test results for all hypotheses 
were examined.105
Hypothesis 1: Subjects who receive rules will be more  
constrained (higher decision change rates and lower law  
satisfaction scores) than subjects who receive standards. 
 We hypothesized that due to the rigidity of rules and relative flex-
ibility of standards, subjects who received rules would be more likely 
                                                                                                                  
 104. Note: conviction data exists for only 28 subjects.
 105. It bears mentioning that subjects who took the experiment in reverse order were 
less likely to show a difference in their two decisions and had higher law satisfaction scores 
than did subjects who took the experiment in normal order. While these results provide an 
interesting window into anchoring in judging, a full discussion of our order hypotheses is 
outside of the scope of this Article.  
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to exhibit legal constraint than subjects who received standards. As 
explained earlier, constraint is measured by the number of subjects 
who granted asylum in the moral or baseline phase but denied asy-
lum during the law phase. A subject may also show constraint106 by 
expressing a lower conviction in the law phase result. Subjects in the 
rule groups showed significantly higher decision rate changes here (F 
= 4.32, p = .04, partial ?2 = .020). In particular, there was a 21.4% 
increase for those under rules but a 10% denial increase for those 
under standards. In addition, rule groups showed higher law decision 
denial rates (F = 3.66, p = .06, partial ?2 = .017). Rule groups had a 
law decision rate of 1.26 versus 1.38 for standard groups. Lastly, rule 
groups had lower law satisfaction scores (F = 33.08, p < .01, partial
?2 = .039), scoring 6.9 versus 7.7 for those under standards. Further 
data is set forth in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Rule Constraint Versus Standard Constraint as Measured 
by Mean Law Decision, Mean Law Satisfaction, and Percentage  
Increase in Denials 
Type of 
Law
N Mean Law
Decision
Rate
Percentage
Increase in 
Denials in 
Law Phase 
Mean Law 
Satisfaction 
(Std. Dev.) 
Standard 128 1.26* 10%** 7.66***
(.178) 
Rule 89 1.38 21.5% 6.85
(.214) 
*Significant at p < .1, **Significant at p < .05, ***Significant at p < .01 
Hypothesis 2: The higher a subject’s baseline satisfaction, the 
less likely the subject will have chosen differently between the 
two phases. 
 Our earlier constraint analysis assumes that preferences are con-
stant—that is, subjects who chose to grant asylum in the baseline 
phase would prefer to grant asylum in the law phase. But of course, 
some subjects will be indifferent to these outcomes in spite of the  
                                                                                                                  
 106. When this drop in conviction is not accompanied by a change in outcome between 
the baseline and law phases, then it is fair to say that the underlying constraint is not as
complete as when it does create such a change in outcome. Nevertheless, even if this con-
straint is partial, it indicates that the norm has exerted an influence on the deliberation of  
the judge.
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real-world consequences built into our model. To provide a more de-
tailed picture of observed legal constraint and to increase the validity 
of our results, we also asked subjects to report their strength of con-
viction in their decisions. If subjects were accurately reporting their 
conviction, we would expect that subjects with lower conviction scores 
in the baseline phase would be more likely to change their positions 
in the law phase than would subjects with higher conviction scores.  
 Curve estimation using baseline satisfaction (N = 197) to predict 
likelihood of a change of decision between phases showed significant 
cubic (F = 2.43, p = .07) and quadratic relations (F = 2.93, p = .06).107
Thus, the Likert scale of satisfaction proved predictive, although not 
at the lower end of the scale. As Graph 1 shows, a clear trend emerg-
es for subjects that have a baseline satisfaction of five or greater in 
the baseline phase: generally, the higher subjects’ satisfaction during 
the baseline phase, the less likely would they change their decision 
during the law phase in favor of denying asylum. We have placed a 
down-right line on the graph to indicate this trend. It is also appar-
ent in Graph 1 that the vast majority of subjects are contained in 
that 5-10 range.108
                                                                                                                  
 107. Interestingly, the relation was not linear. A look at the data revealed why: a  
handful of subjects that gave very low satisfaction scores in the baseline phase changed 
positions in the opposite way that one would expect (denying in baseline but granting in 
law phase). It is possible that they gave low scores simply because they did not feel  
very strongly about anything in the experiment, which might have affected effort and  
comprehension levels.
 108. It might be argued that the reverse order subjects (N = 101), because they received 
the law condition first, might try to reverse engineer their baseline measures to conform 
with their law phase measures, thus making this relation somewhat artificial. Even con-
sidering only normal order subjects, however, the result is the same, cubic (F= 2.99, p = .04) 
and quadratic (F = 3.91, p = .02) as Table 5 shows: 
Equation Type R-Sq. F 
Cubic .09 2.99** 
Quadratic .07 3.91** 
**Significant at p < .05
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Graph 1: Percentage of Constrained by Baseline Satisfaction  
(All Subjects)
Table 5 provides further data. 
Table 5: Regression Analysis: Independent Variable Baseline Satis-
faction and Dependent Variable Change of Decision 
Equation Type R-Sq. F
Cubic .03 2.99*
Quadratic .04 3.91*
 *Significant at p < .1 
If we look more closely at this relation by distinguishing rule groups 
from standard groups, we would expect that the relation would be 
more pronounced under rules than under standards; the former pre-
dictably put pressure on subjects to change positions whereas the lat-
ter do not. Indeed, this is true. A significant quadratic relation (F = 
2.94, p = .06) emerges under rules but no significant relation emerges 
under standards. The following two Graphs (2 & 3) display this dif-
ference. Notice a similar down-right trend (drawn with a line) that 
emerges under rules in Graph 2.  
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Graph 2: Percentage of Constrained by Baseline Satisfaction  
(Rule Groups) 
Table 5 provides further data. 
Table 5: Regression Analysis: Independent Variable Baseline Satisfac-
tion and Dependent Variable Change of Decision (Rule Groups Only) 
Equation Type R-Sq. F
Quadratic .08 2.95*
  *Significant at p < .1 
No statistically significant trend emerges with the standard groups, 
as seen in Graph 3. 
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Graph 3: Percentage of Constrained by Baseline Satisfaction  
(Standard Groups) 
Hypothesis 3: Subjects who receive argument will show lower 
constraint scores (lower decision change rates, higher law 
confidence) than subjects who receive no argument. 
 The results of hypotheses 1 and 2 indicate that subjects’ prefer-
ences between phases are constant, that these preferences may be 
constrained by legal norms, and that the strength of a subject’s pref-
erence is correlated to that subject’s willingness to work to overcome 
the legal constraint. Within this framework, any tool that assists 
subjects in their desired task of overcoming a contrary legal norm 
should decrease constraint scores. Subjects in the argument groups 
did not show significant lower decision change rates (N = 115, Mean 
Increase in Denials = 11%) than subjects who received no argument 
(N = 102, Mean Increase in Denials = 20%, f = 2.62, p = .11, partial ?2
= .012).109 However, the argument groups’ law denial rates (24%) 
were significantly lower than groups which received no argument 
(41%, f = 7.84, p < .01, partial ?2 = .036). This finding allowed us to 
                                                                                                                  
 109. Four (N = 4) standard argument subjects actually denied at the baseline and 
granted at the law phase. 
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proceed to analyze the effect by norm content type. Interestingly, 
though the argument groups had far fewer denials, they did not have 
significantly higher satisfaction scores. This information is summa-
rized in the results table below.  
Exposure to 
Argument 
N Mean Law 
Decision 
Rate 
Percentage 
Increase in 
Denials in 
Law Phase 
Mean Law 
Satisfaction 
(Std. Dev.)
No Argument 102 1.41* 20% 7.32 
(.202)
Argument 115 1.24 11% 7.19 
(.191)
*Significant at p < .01 
Hypothesis 4: There will be significantly fewer constrained 
subjects under the argument and rule condition than under 
the rule condition, and there will not be a significant differ-
ence in the number of constrained subjects between the ar-
gument and standard condition and the standard condition. 
 Because rules pose a greater threat of constraint than standards 
(as shown in hypothesis 1) we would expect argument to have a larg-
er effect size in the rule groups rather than the standards groups. A 
significant interaction was detected for type of law and exposure to 
argument in relation to likelihood of change in decision across phases 
(F = 6.170, p = .014, partial ?2 = .029). Subjects who received rules 
were much less likely to have differing decisions if they also received 
argument. However, argument had no significant effect on subjects 
who received standards. Table 7 provides further data: 
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Table 7: Interaction Between Presence of Argument and Type of Legal 
Norm Content (Rule vs. Standard) on Change of Decision 
Dep. Var. df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Change of 
Decision 
1, 216 .956 6.170 .014 .029
This difference is most pronounced when results broken down by 
group as in Table 8 and Table 9. 
Table 8: Mean Increase in Denials by Presence of Argument and 
Type of Legal Norm 
No Argument Argument  
Standard 10% 11% 
Rule 35%** 9%
**Significantly different from all other groups at p < .05, post hoc 
with Sidak correction factor.  
Table 9: Law Denial Rate Estimate Marginal Means by Presence of 
Argument and Type of Legal Norm 
No Argument Argument  
Standard 1.30 1.22 
Rule 1.52** 1.25 
**Significantly different from Standard Argument and Rule Argument 
groups at p < .05, post hoc with Sidak correction factor.  
V. ANALYSIS: RESULTS, LIMITATIONS, AVENUES FOR FURTHER STUDY,
AND IMPLICATIONS
 In this Part, we interpret the results, focusing first on how they 
relate to our hypotheses and then expanding outward to their impli-
cations for future empirical endeavor and for society in general.  
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A.   Analysis of Results 
 At the outset, it is important to begin by noting that we have rep-
licated the fundamental findings of previous studies.110 In particular, 
there is considerable support that our basic intuitions about the dif-
ferential constraining power of rules and standards are true. That is, 
the experiment provided evidence that the rule constrained more 
than the standard did. Moreover, as expected, the likelihood of con-
straint was significantly related to the strength of one’s satisfaction 
that a particular result ought to be brought about in the absence of 
law. These results, like those pertaining to the within subjects hy-
potheses, ought to increase our confidence in the internal validity of 
this testing instrument: both dependent variables provide useful in-
formation and the instrument as a whole is capable of reproducing 
past results. Furthermore, similar results have been achieved 
through other empirical methodologies.111
 More specifically, rules appear to be significantly more constrain-
ing than standards, with a denial rate 22% higher during the law 
phase than during the baseline phase, compared to a denial rate 10% 
higher during the law phase than during the baseline phase for the 
standard. Though it should be noted that neither norm appeared to 
constrain a majority of subjects overall. Of philosophical interest, 
however, is the fact that standards did produce significant constraint 
when considering all conditions, albeit less than the constraint  
produced by rules. Thus, even the reasonableness standard used 
here—which is about as pure a standard as one will likely encounter 
in the law112—did not simply reduce to an all-things-considered de-
termination, the very determination subjects were asked to do during 
the baseline phase.  
 The constraint differential between rules and standards is im-
portant because it supports the notion that the content of the law 
that bears on the dispute before the judge frames the level of effort 
that the judge will have to put forth if she chooses to seek an ideolog-
ically or personally pleasing result. It would be fair to characterize 
                                                                                                                  
 110. See sources cited supra notes 33-34.
 111. See sources cited supra note 102.
 112. Our standard did not exist in the presence of many factors that are believed to be 
responsible for “rulification” of standards, making them less evaluative and, thus, more 
rule-like over time. For instance, our simulation omitted factors such as numerous applica-
tions of cases involving similar facts under the same law, a network of germane statutory 
rules, and a clear background morality to the legal system. See Mark D. Rosen, Multiple 
Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the 
Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 491 (2000) (“As the Standard is applied 
over a series of cases, it almost always becomes increasingly rule-like. This occurs because 
cases, by nature, are disputes that involve particular facts. As the cases are decided they 
become examples of what, as a concrete matter, the Standard means.”); Schauer, supra
note 37, at 803-05.
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this as the Legalist component of the relationship legal argument 
plays in legal constraint. Rules, it would appear from the data, pos-
sess stronger constraining power, but legal argument can lessen that 
power under certain circumstances, which would undercut the ex-
treme Attitudinalist model of judging.  
 By elucidating these circumstances, however, it becomes clear 
that mainstream Critical accounts of legal argument effect also  
receive support—particularly, the claim that ideology is the engine 
behind a judge’s efforts to get around clear rules and to their resort to  
legal argumentation.  
1.   The Strength of Subjects’ Preferences Mattered 
 Statistical analysis revealed that, consistent with mainstream 
Critical accounts of judging, the more ideologically passionate the 
subject, the more likely it is that the subject will decide for an ideo-
logically preferable result. And consistent with mainstream Attitudi-
nalism, a subset of these subjects reached ideologically or personally 
favored results despite a straightforward rule to the contrary. Thus, 
knowing the direction and strength of a subject’s satisfaction in the 
baseline phase helps us predict how that subject will decide during 
the law phase.  
 This finding parallels the result in many of the Supreme Court 
argument studies that salience matters—specifically, that the Court 
is more likely to stick to its ideological guns in salient cases.113 As 
discussed, salience is a proxy for the Supreme Court’s ideological fa-
miliarity with and passion for the outcomes of the cases they consider, 
much like satisfaction was for our subjects.114 Thus, we suspect that 
the justices that feel more strongly about their preferred outcome are 
more likely to reach that outcome.  
 One distinction in our study, however, was that ideological or per-
sonal influence was most pronounced for only a subsection of our cas-
es. Indeed, subjects under standards were most likely to let their 
baseline preferences dictate their decisions during the law phase. 
The differences under the legal argument condition were also smaller 
for subjects in standard groups. Thus, there is evidence that ideology 
mattered most during the law phase when the law was indetermi-
nate. Most empirical studies of judging do not consider the level of 
indeterminacy of the laws before the judges, including the aforemen-
tioned studies of legal argument before the Supreme Court. The ques-
tion we ought to ask is why the subjects who were in the standard 
groups in our simulation behaved most like Supreme Court justices in  
salient cases. 
                                                                                                                  
 113. See Collins, supra note 39; McAtee & McGuire, supra note 39. 
 114. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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 One explanation is that there is a similar level of indeterminacy 
between the issues the Supreme Court faces and the issue that the 
subjects in the standard group considered. Numerous scholars have 
claimed that a higher proportion of the legal issues before the Su-
preme Court are, or are perceived by the judges to be,115 indetermi-
nate.116 Such legal openness makes the issue before the justice take 
on a standard-like character, lessening the pressure on justices to go 
against their ideology and, as will be discussed again below, to seek 
the tools of argument.  
 There is even evidence that salient cases have a higher proportion 
of indeterminate issues than do other Supreme Court cases. A recent 
study supports the notion that salience increases the likelihood of 
plurality decisions to the same extent as do other indicators of inde-
terminacy, such as lower court dissensus and the presence of a con-
stitutional or a civil rights issue.117
  Thus, this study provides evidence that judges pursue the out-
comes that they favor in the absence of law, and they are more success-
ful in reaching those outcomes under conditions of legal indeterminacy. 
2.   Subjects Used Argument Instrumentally 
 Across all conditions, the presence of legal argumentation reduced 
the likelihood that denials of asylum would occur despite the fact 
that the arguments were evenly balanced for each side. Because most 
of our subjects favored granting asylum in the baseline, it is unsur-
prising that they were more likely to side with granting asylum dur-
ing the law condition when there were arguments to that effect pre-
sent, indifferent to the additional presence of arguments going the 
other direction of generally equal weight. In other words, the pres-
ence of balanced argument appears to produce an asymmetrical effect 
                                                                                                                  
 115. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Mak-
ing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (2003) (footnotes omitted) (“Most significantly, the Su-
preme Court’s docket consists of many more ‘very hard’ cases than do those of the lower 
appellate courts. The majority of the cases in the circuit courts admit of a right or a best 
answer and do not require the exercise of discretion. Lower appellate courts are thus con-
strained far more than the Supreme Court.”).
 116. The empirical studies upon which we are relying consider only written decisions of 
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 39. Lawrence Solum points out that the 
Supreme Court makes many, many more decisions that are straightforward. Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1742 (1988) (“During last term, the Court had 4,339 cases on its docket. 
Only 175 of these cases resulted in written opinions, and 102 of these were decided by per 
curiam or memorandum decisions. The thesis that the Court is presented only with hard 
cases finds its strongest support in the large number of 5-4 decisions by the Court; there 
were 45 last term. Surely these are hard cases. More troubling for this thesis is the only 
marginally smaller number of unanimous decisions.”).
 117. See Corley et al., supra note 65, at 192-94.
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in the direction that the judges preferred. A plausible118 explanation 
of this statistic is that the subjects, consciously or not, read the ar-
guments in a biased way, such that the arguments served to make it 
more likely that the subjects could justify a decision in that direction. 
That is, the presence of favorable argument, even when paired with an 
unfavorable argument, reduced the “work” of overcoming a constrain-
ing legal norm.  
 This asymmetrical effect was even more pronounced under the 
rule condition. There, the data supports that subjects were more like-
ly to use the arguments on their preferred side as tools to pursue 
their own ends. Prior findings, including those from the same series 
of experiments that gave rise to this Article,119 provide evidence that 
rules put more pressure on subjects to conform to the directive that 
they deny asylum for late filings. The possibility that they are able to 
resist this pressure more effectively in the presence of argument sup-
ports the notion that they conceive of and/or treat argument as a 
helpful tool for reaching their preferred result of granting asylum.  
 This bar graph (Graph 4) helps visualize the interaction between 
the presence of argument and legal norm content type. Note that 
when the legal norm is a rule, the presence of argument leads the 
judges to stick to their ideological guns more often, as predicted. 
Standards do not exhibit this effect; to the contrary, there were more 
denials under the argument condition than under the pure standard, 
although this difference did not reach statistical significance.  
                                                                                                                  
 118. Another possibility—albeit one that is less plausible due to the theoretical sophis-
tication it presumes—is that the subjects did not consider the merits of the arguments in a 
biased way but rather saw in the arguments the same kind of openness in law that was 
described in Karl Llewellyn’s seminal article. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theo-
ry of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed,
3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950). There, Llewellyn assembled popular canons of construc-
tion into conflicting pairs to illustrate how the canons fail to lend further constraining 
power to law in hard cases. Id. at 401-06. It is possible that by presenting our arguments in 
a similarly paired, conflicting fashion, subjects were reminded of their heartfelt, unbiased 
belief that the underlying, secondary materials of the law in complex legal systems display 
tremendous openness and opportunity for interpretation. As a result, they might have 
worked harder to seek adjudicative routes that were not straightforward and were more 
reflective of their moral views. 
 119. See Sheppard, supra note 32 (finding that time limitation enhanced constraining 
power of rules but not standards and surmising that this indicated that rules make work-
ing around straightforward directives of law more difficult than do standards).
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Graph 4: Mean Increase in Asylum Denials (Law Phase Minus Baseline)  
The following graph (Graph 5) shows how the rule argument groups, 
both normal and reverse order, experienced far fewer changes in  
decision than other groups. Note the two argument groups are more 
horizontal than the non-argument groups. 
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Graph 5: Asylum Denial Rate Across Phases (Rule Groups) (Norm = 
Normal Order, Rev = Reverse Order) 
Compare this to the standards (Graph 6), where the argument groups 
and non-argument groups do not exhibit paired similar angles. 
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Graph 6: Asylum Denial Rate Across Phases (Standard Groups) 
(Norm = Normal Order, Rev = Reverse Order) 
 This finding, too, shines a light on prior research. Corley’s study of 
Supreme Court plagiarism provided evidence that, when there is 
compatibility between a justice’s ideological preference and the result 
called for in an argument, it is more likely that the justice will use 
language from that brief in his or her legal opinion.120 Furthermore, 
this propensity towards the instrumental use of legal argument oc-
curred even in salient cases. Again, we find evidence of the instru-
mental use of legal argument, but unlike Corley, we connect its use 
to the level of difficulty that the law poses for the judge who seeks to 
reach a preferred result. Of course, even if Corley had chosen to 
study this dimension of adjudication, it is possible that the unique 
conditions of the Supreme Court minimize the effect of legal argu-
ment as a general matter regardless of the content of the individual 
laws that might apply to the Court’s cases. For one, as discussed, the 
issues before the Supreme Court likely have a more standardized 
character;121 our study suggests that the effect of argument would be 
weakest in such situations. Compared to their lower court counter-
parts, Supreme Court justices likely feel less pressure from the law, 
                                                                                                                  
 120. See Corley, supra note 52, at 476-77.
 121. See discussion supra Part V.A.1.
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itself, to reach conclusions that are at odds with their ideological 
preferences due to the fact that they face a higher proportion of hard 
cases. In turn, they might feel less pressure to rely upon the work of 
the advocates that appear before them. This pressure might further 
be reduced by the fact that Supreme Court justices have more time 
and resources to craft their opinions than do most other courts.122 As 
a result, it is possible that justices are better able to satisfy them-
selves that they can write convincing justifications in support of their 
determinations under their own steam than are lower court judges. 
Perhaps these factors simply make Corley’s discovery of the preva-
lence of legal argument plagiarism at the Supreme Court all the  
more remarkable.   
B.   Limitations and Avenues for Further Study 
 This experiment tested a very narrow range of circumstances: a 
single fact-pattern and set of arguments under two different laws. 
Furthermore, the parameters were constricted so as to maximize the 
likelihood that the case could serve as a battleground for the two con-
flicting motivations of typical judges: the motivation to write convinc-
ing legal justifications and the motivation to have cases come out in 
an ideologically or personally preferred way.123 The case at the heart 
of this simulation touched upon an ideologically divisive issue so that 
a cross-section of our subjects would feel motivated to fight against a 
straightforward, constraining rule.  
 It can be argued that such conflict is atypical, and if this can be 
demonstrated, that would surely limit the generalizability of these 
results. We agree that we must be careful to avoid placing more 
                                                                                                                  
 122. Argument might be even further unnecessary in salient cases. When a case is 
salient, it is more likely that the justices care more about the case and, as a result, have 
already internally deliberated about the appropriate outcome, especially since the Court 
has the ability to spot issues that might come before them long before they arrive.
 123. Duncan Kennedy’s phenomenological account of judging is illuminating:  
Suppose you approach me [as a judge] in my dark cloud of ignorance of whether 
or not I will be able to overcome the gap between the law and how-I-want-to-
come-out. You argue that legal rules . . . never determine the outcome of a case. 
And since the legal rules are the only things that stand in the way of my com-
ing out the way I want to come out, I have no problem. 
. . . .  
My experience with legal argument doesn’t allow me to meet your jurispruden-
tial position on its own ground. What I can say as legal arguer is that some-
times I come up against the rule as a felt objectivity, and can’t budge it. This 
doesn’t mean that I agree with it or that I think anyone would necessarily con-
demn me if I disregarded or changed it. All it means is that I say to myself, 
“Here’s the rule that applies to this case;” “we all know that this is the rule;” 
and “here’s how it applies;” and “Everyone is going to apply it that way.” 
Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 560-61 (1986).
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weight on these findings than they can bear. It is also true, however, 
that a unique dimension of judging is that judges’ primary motiva-
tions are so often in conflict. Judges want to reach the morally, per-
sonally or ideologically best result and they want to follow the law, 
and those interests are not in perfect alignment in a considerable 
number of cases. This experiment makes both of those interests tan-
gible for our subjects through monetary rewards. Of course, judges do 
not always find themselves facing a conflict. Sometimes the law 
points in the desired direction. Sometimes the law is so vague that it 
does not seem to point in a single direction at all. But sometimes the 
judge must answer a difficult question: “Do I follow the straightfor-
ward dictates of the law, or do I work to identify a legal justification 
that supports the result I desire?” We sought to incorporate all of 
these scenarios into the experimental design: the first is under the 
rule condition for anti-asylum subjects, the second is under the stand-
ard, and the third is under the rule for pro-asylum subjects. Admit-
tedly, we excluded the first category of subjects from our analysis. 
 Regarding the argument independent variable, it is unclear that 
this result would occur if legal argumentation were asymmetrically 
balanced in favor of the ideologically unpopular decision, such as 
when more amicus briefs are filed on one side.124 The arguments here 
were symmetrical in number and weight. Thus, if it can be demon-
strated that it is atypical for arguments to be balanced that would 
also limit the usefulness of this study. Similarly, it is unclear how our 
results would apply to cases in which there are asymmetries in the 
quality with which arguments are delivered. As a result, we do not 
believe that our findings threaten or support those reached in studies 
of attorney quality.  
 Regarding the law independent variable, numerous scholars have 
pointed out that rules and standards exist on a continuum, with legal 
norms that fall in between the two poles greatly outnumbering those 
at the ends.125 A smaller number of scholars claim that pure rules 
and pure standards do not exist, but it is difficult to make sense of 
these claims.126 The simulation here that we have described as a “pure” 
                                                                                                                  
 124. See Collins, supra note 39.
 125. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter,
2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1399 (“The fact that rules and standards exist on relative degrees 
of vagueness and complexity means that few laws are ‘pure rules’ or ‘pure standards,’  
and that we can move from one to the other in degrees by adjusting their vagueness or  
their complexity.”).
 126. Amichai Cohen, Rules and Standards in the Application of International Humani-
tarian Law, 41 ISR. L. REV. 41, 42, 44 (2008) (stating, “[a]s already mentioned, there exists 
no pure rule or standard” although stating earlier in the article that “there exist almost no 
‘pure’ rules and standards”); Michael Holley, Making Credibility Determinations at Sum-
mary Judgment: How Judges Broaden Their Discretion While “Playing by the Rules,” 20 
WHITTIER L. REV. 865, 869 (1999) (footnote omitted) (“Much has been written about rules 
and standards, and definitions of both abound. Such definitions usually acknowledge that 
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rule—a legal norm whose content is maximally constraining—should 
not be mistaken for a situation in which there is a perfect rule—a 
legal norm whose content always constrains completely—which 
might not even exist. And the same goes for standards except with 
respect to discretion. A pure standard is maximally discretionary, but 
it is not yet known whether a standard can be perfectly discretionary. 
Such limitations are as true here as they are in the real world.   
 The hard question is whether the rules and standards in this sim-
ulation are unrealistically pure. In the real world, the circumstances 
are most ripe for purity when a piece of legislation is first promulgat-
ed in an uncongested legal field.127 These circumstances can arise in a 
number of ways: they can come about because the new legislation is 
complete and operates to replace preexisting directives in the domain 
to which it applies (such as when a worker’s compensation table is 
issued), or because the directive represents the first time that the 
domain has been regulated (such as when states began regulating 
the de-leading of rental homes or the use of carbon monoxide detec-
tors128), or because the directive exists in a jurisdiction where there is 
little to no recognition of precedent (such as in civil law states or 
countries129). It is certainly possible that actual legal norms possess 
the same purity as the norms used here, but it is nevertheless clear 
that this is not always, and probably not usually, the case.  
 Another considerable limitation is that the subjects probably had 
never before engaged in judicial decisionmaking on an issue of this 
sort before. All were young lawyers or law students. Further judi-
cial or legal experience might affect the likelihood that real world 
judges would rely upon legal argument, or it might affect their pas-
sion for ideology, either of which could change effect sizes or eliminate  
effect altogether.   
 But does the bare fact that the subjects were not judges invalidate 
the results? We think not. Judges receive the majority of their formal 
training in law school.130 Moreover, one of our lessons from existing 
empirical work is that judges are human—erroneous and prone to 
bias. In 1993, Richard Posner famously answered the question, “what 
                                                                                                                  
it is impossible to define one term without reference to the other, because pure rules and 
standards cannot be said to exist.”).
 127. See supra note 112.
 128. 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 180.
 129. See, e.g., In re Orso, 283 F.3d 686, 695 n.29 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (describing 
lack of stare decisis in Louisiana).
 130. See CHERYL THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL STUDIES BD., REVIEW OF JUDICIAL 
TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 19 (2006), available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-legal/docs/Review_of_Judicial_Train.pdf (stating that while 
some organizations, such as the National Judicial College, Federal Judicial Center, and 
National Center for State Courts, specialize in the training of judges, judges in the federal 
courts have no training requirements and state courts require only between 7 to 15 hours 
of training per year).
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do judges and justices maximize?” with a resounding, “the same thing 
everybody else does.”131 Although his goal was to make the economic 
study of judging a respectable academic field—and he succeeded—he 
achieved another goal.132 He demonstrated the appropriateness of 
drawing parallels between the motivations of judges and the motiva-
tions of those that experience similar incentives, even those in such 
far flung contexts as non-profit organization management, election 
voting booths, and theatrical audiences.133 This testing instrument 
attempted carefully to mimic those incentives. Whether it succeeded 
can be questioned, but we can be heartened by the fact that it has 
replicated real-world results (such as the influence of time on deci-
sionmaking as well as the differential constraining effect of rules and 
standards) and returned consistent experimental results.  
 Regarding the limitations posed by the divisive nature of the issue 
that our subjects adjudicated, we must again temper our desire ag-
gressively to generalize from our results. The majority of cases do not 
concern hot-button issues. Still, we must not hastily dismiss their 
application to real-life cases. Despite the fact that our simulated case 
was more ideologically salient than many legal cases are, the testing 
instrument nevertheless allowed us to monitor the passions of our 
subjects. And it was apparent that they exhibited an entire spectrum 
of passions with respect to the fact pattern. Most subjects labeled 
themselves as six or seven out of ten in their level of satisfaction re-
garding the rightness of granting asylum in the baseline phase. Sec-
ondly, cases in which parties miss deadlines and risk losing other-
wise meritorious cases, such as we had here, are not at all atypical.134
 Perhaps most importantly, we also wish to emphasize that our 
goal here has been to focus on foundational aspects of adjudication 
rather than on the particular dynamics of legal argument in the 
American court system. This is a study of how legal argument im-
pacts adjudication, broadly understood. And while our wish to exam-
ine this fundamental dimension of legal practice somewhat abstractly 
limits the directness with which our findings may be applied to any 
particular court, it might permit broad but indirect application to  
courts, generally.   
 In short, we view this study as a contribution to the basic level of 
our understanding of legal argument. Our hope is that the results 
will lead to further behavioral experimentation in this context as well 
                                                                                                                  
 131. Richard A. Posner, What do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993).
 132. Id.
 133. Id. at 1. (“[T]he essay models the judicial utility function in terms that allows [sic] 
judges to be seen as ordinary people responding rationally to ordinary incentives.”).
 134. Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 949 n.84 (2008) (“Although agencies make quicker decisions if they 
confront deadlines, all else being equal, they often miss the deadlines themselves.”).
2013]          FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT 589
as inform the hypotheses of future statistical research of actual cases. 
Further studies could test more varieties of argument, different com-
binations of argument unbalance, or argument from different 
sources. Each of these factors might influence the attractiveness of 
resorting to argument and the final decision made. Also, studies 
ought to consider evolution from repeat play. Analysis of or experi-
mentation with repeat cases or progeny cases before the same judge 
would help us further understand the power of familiarity and salience 
on decisionmaking.  
C.   Political and Social Implications 
With the disclaimer that further study is necessary, the results 
here challenge a number of widely held sociopolitical assumptions. 
Most important is the assumption of our jurisprudence that legal ar-
gument performs a valuable public service: in the hands of our ad-
versarial system, the presence of legal argument in a case makes it 
more likely that the judge deciding the case will reach the best legal 
result.135 To many people, the straightforward application of the law 
is the best, or even the correct, way to resolve a legal dispute.136 They 
not only believe that the law provides clear enough guidance to per-
mit judges to reach objectively best or correct results—an assumption 
that they share with the Legalists—they also believe that when the 
straightforward result is evident, the judge has a legal and social du-
ty to reach that result.137 Insofar as the scenario tested here is repre-
sentative of typical cases, the results suggest that legal argument can 
work against these goals: it can help judges get around the straight-
forward commands of the law. For those fond of the term, it could 
fairly be stated that the results indicate a relationship between legal 
argument and “judicial activism.”138 Perhaps the aspect of our results 
                                                                                                                  
 135. See supra Part I.
 136. See Donald R. Songer et al., Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical 
Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963, 970-71 (1989) (“If the case involves, as the criteria 
suggests, the straightforward application of clear and well-settled precedent which is not in 
need of any published explanation by the courts of appeals, then the correct decision and 
the correct basis of decision should be obvious to any person who is well trained in the law. 
Since federal district court judges are highly trained professionals, they should be expected 
to reach the correct decision in such cases and thus to have their decisions affirmed.”). See
also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
 137. See Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1985) 
(“The language of the statute at issue is plain and straightforward and the words, there-
fore, must be accorded their plain meaning.”); Mark Tushnet, Self-Formalism, Precedent, 
and the Rule of Law, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1583, 1589 (1997) (“I won't do the conceptual 
work if I think of myself as a ‘plain-meaning kind of guy.’ Rules are straightforward lin-
guistic statements whose meanings are apparent to me upon reading them.”).
 138. Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 211, 235 (1988) (“[P]eople would object less to our favorite activist decisions if we 
could convince them that those decisions emerged from a straightforward reading of the  
constitutional text.”).
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that is most troubling in this regard is the fact that this effect oc-
curred when the law’s power was at its apex, that is, when the law 
was in the form of a pure rule and therefore was capable of straight-
forward application.139 This is a red flag that the marketplace of ideas 
principle justifying our adversary system might be a poor fit in the 
judicial context because the ultimate arbiters—the judges—will fail 
to evaluate the ideas with an objective eye.140 We have common sense 
and empirical grounds141 to believe that judges are, like all of us, po-
litical animals,142 and they are motivated in sufficiently salient or 
otherwise ideologically important cases to consider arguments in a  
one-sided fashion.  
 Of course, our results are likely to have the most predictive value 
in areas of the law that have a strongly rule-like or strongly stand-
ard-like character. The law is heterogeneous patchwork, with some 
areas being distinctly more standard-like or rule-like than others. 
Moreover, our findings challenge commonly held assumptions per-
taining to those areas.  
 Standard-like areas have a higher proportion of norms with eval-
uative content or similar tests that force judges to utilize their discre-
tion.143 For example, numerous scholars maintain that balance tests 
provide judges with near unlimited discretion.144 After all, when the 
balancing test asks for weighing the incommensurable or comparing 
the incongruous—for example, balancing a bushel of horsefeathers 
against next Thursday, as Chief Justice Roger Traynor famously ob-
served145—the judge is likely to arrive at her favored results because 
the test does not prescribe any specific result. Academics have made 
much of this fact in the fields of intellectual property and constitu-
                                                                                                                  
 139. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 122-23 
(1978); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHAN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
166 (1863).
 140. See, e.g., HAZARD, JR., supra note 139, at 122-23; STEPHAN, supra note 139, at 166.
 141. See COLLINS, supra note 49.
 142. Cf. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS I.2. (T.A. Sinclair trans., 1962).
 143. See Sheppard, supra note 34.
 144. See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Con-
stitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 266 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (“Commen-
tators and judges who prefer standards or balancing tests in constitutional law argue that 
standards advance values of fairness and substantive equality by permitting individuated 
results. Furthermore, by increasing the deliberation about the value choices underlying 
substantive decisions, standards promote constitutional dialogue and render decisionmak-
ers more accountable.”); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 
1467 (1995) (“One common charge against the typical multipronged standard and multi-
part opinion is that many of the so-called standards or tests are far less useful than their 
superficial complexity and appearance of precision might indicate.”); Patricia M. Wald, The 
Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 
1394 (1995) (“Balancing tests” are “mansions of many rooms in which implementing judges 
may move about freely . . . .”).
 145. Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,  
754 (1963).
2013]          FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT 591
tional law. Trademark infringement suits revolving around the like-
lihood of confusion, for example, require a test with at least eight fac-
tors.146 Fair use analysis focuses on four non-exhaustive factors with 
variable weights.147 The idiosyncratic application of these tests has 
naturally led to unpredictable results.148 Unpredictability is perhaps 
most pronounced when dealing with the Establishment Clause, 
where it is not entirely clear which test to apply and the meaning of 
the factors within one test are not fixed.149
 Rule-like areas of the law have a higher proportion of descriptive, 
bright-line norm content.150 One of the most important areas of the 
law with rule-like character is the criminal law. Though recent Su-
preme Court decisions151 have made the federal sentencing guidelines 
merely advisory, the federal criminal code remains replete with 
mandatory minimum and maximum sentences based on quantitative 
empirical findings. For example, a defendant convicted of possessing 
a certain weight of drugs152 or with a certain number of prior convic-
tions153 will have a vastly different sentencing range than a defendant 
                                                                                                                  
 146. The Ninth Circuit employs the eight-factor Sleekcraft test: strength of mark; prox-
imity of goods; similarity of marks; evidence of actual confusion; marketing channels used; 
types of goods and degree of consumer care expected; defendants’ intent in selecting the 
mark; and likelihood of expansion of product lines. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape 
Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 147. The four factors are “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature 
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The Supreme Court has vacillat-
ed as to whether the factors are to be weighed equally. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (noting that all the factors are “to be explored, and 
the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright”) with Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (declaring market harm factor 
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”); see also Note, Spare the 
Mod: In Support of Total-Conversion Modified Video Games, 125 HARV. L. REV. 789, 797-
802 (2011) (collecting criticism of the doctrine).
 148. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 561-64, 604-06 (2008). 
 149. Compare Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819-20 (2010) (doubting appropri-
ateness of test) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (setting out test). See also
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2009); Cnty. of Allegheny v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 594-95 (1989). 
 150. Sheppard, supra note 34, at 97-98.
 151. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 242-44 (2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 481 (2000).
 152. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012) (“In the case of a person who violates section 
922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 
922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on 
occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and im-
prisoned not less than fifteen years . . . .”).
 153. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2012) (“In the case of less than 50 kilograms of 
marihuana, except in the case of 50 or more marihuana plants regardless of weight, 10 
kilograms of hashish, or one kilogram of hashish oil or in the case of any controlled  
substance in schedule III (other than gamma hydroxybutyric acid), or 30 milligrams of 
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who does not meet those criteria. Judicial displeasure with the sen-
tencing guidelines is evinced in countless opinions criticizing enormous 
sentences for crack cocaine possession154 and child pornography.155
 One of our primary findings was the disparate impact of argument 
on legal constraint. A majority of subjects who were confronted with 
the hard and fast rule (a straightforward reading of which would re-
quire deportation) did indeed deny asylum. When argument was in-
troduced (even argument weighted equally on both sides of the issue), 
however, a mere quarter of the rule subjects denied asylum. Argu-
ment, therefore, seems to be of greater importance when a case in-
volves a rule rather than a standard.  
 When cases fall into these areas of law, one would normally as-
sume that advocacy would be of relatively heightened importance 
compared to areas in which the law is rule-like: convince the judge 
that your side is right and there will be nothing standing in the way 
of your preferred verdict. However, our results suggest that the oppo-
site appears to be true. Instead, the advocate is most valuable when 
she provides a legal escape for a motivated judge facing a straight-
forward, rigid rule.  
 Turning now to the social utility of legal argument, we wish to be 
clear: We do not believe that these results ought to be seen as lending 
support to an initiative to strip legal argument from litigation, if any 
such initiative were to arise. Even if the presence of legal argument 
poses a risk that the judge will use argumentation as an ideological 
or personal tool, the no-argument alternative, without much, much 
more invasive measures (such as aggressive additional resource re-
striction of dubious value and oversight) would do little to hinder ide-
ologically motivated judges from reaching their preferred decisions. 
Rather, our modest hope is that these results spur increased scrutiny 
of judicial consideration of legal argument and should dampen the 
Legalist rhetoric that bolsters the adversary system.  
 More heartening, perhaps, are the results that lend support to as-
pects of Legalism, such as the evidence that legal content, particular-
ly the distinction between rules and standards, constrains in an ex-
pected manner (even if it did not constrain as many subjects as might 
be expected). In other areas of court study, there is a quickly develop-
ing consensus that empiricists engaging in statistical analysis of ac-
                                                                                                                  
flunitrazepam, such person shall, except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this sub-
section, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years . . . .”).
 154. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (responding, 
in part, to these judicial concerns).
 155. See, e.g., United States v. Apodaca, 641 F.3d 1077, 1082-84 (9th Cir. 2011) (re-
viewing sentence for substantive reasonableness); United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 
603-10 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 182-88 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(same).
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tual cases can no longer ignore the content of law that judges consid-
er.156 The results here might be a valuable addition to that literature 
because they show empirically, and for the first time, a powerful in-
teraction between legal norm content and the effect of legal argu-
ment. Moreover, the increased constraint of rules in this simulation 
overpowered the dampening effect of argument on them. That is, 
rules can operate as a check on judicial ideological motivation even in 
an environment of balanced legal argument. 
 Lastly, this study helps us understand legal constraint as a fragile 
phenomenon, one augmented by factors that are outside of the con-
straining power possessed by authoritative legal texts alone. Just as 
the time judges have to decide cases matters,157 the availability of le-
gal argument matters. Those jurists who have analyzed law’s con-
straining power conceptually have tended to view law in isolation;158
what matters to them is the native constraint of the terms in the le-
gal norm itself. While it is undoubtedly true that norm content per-
forms in ways that are largely consistent with, but not identical to, 
our philosophical intuitions, the possibility that extra-legal factors 
might make a tremendous predictable difference to adjudication 
means that we must lift our eyes from the books and examine the 
entire context in which the judge as a human subject finds herself. As 
much as we might wish to model this context using a single simpli-
fied model of judicial behavior, such as those advanced from Legal-
ism, Attitudinalism, or Institutionalism, it is more likely that judges 
are like the rest of us—small things can make a big difference: 
Thus, a judge's decision process is bound to be affected by the par-
ticular psychological environment within which it is performed. 
Rather than adopt a single unitary conception of the modus op-
erandi of a judge—such as Dworkin’s Hercules or Kennedy’s politi-
cal judge—we can benefit more from following a differentiated ap-
proach that corresponds to more precise types of psychological en-
vironments in which judges operate.159
                                                                                                                  
 156. See Cox & Miles, supra note 33 (footnote omitted) (“Debates about rules and 
standards almost inevitably begin with the presumption that rules constrain judges more 
than standards. Judicial decisions seemingly provide a wealth of potential empirical data 
about the strength of this presumption. But by sidestepping legal doctrine almost entirely, 
studies of judicial behavior fail to capitalize on this resource. Studies that consider whether 
rule-like doctrines actually exert a more constraining effect than standard-like ones are 
remarkably rare. In view of the resurgent interest in empirical legal studies, the omission 
of legal doctrine from statistical studies of judicial decisionmaking is particularly surpris-
ing.”); Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Deci-
sionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1547 n.39 (2009).
 157. See Sheppard, supra note 32.
 158. See, e.g., HART, supra note 20, at 128-36, 272-73; JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW 103-05 (1979).
 159. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 
39 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
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VI.   CONCLUSION
 This study provides empirical evidence that legal argument affects 
the resolution of the disputes in which they are raised. The observed 
influence has two important—and surprising—dimensions. First, the 
presence of balanced legal argument appears to have affected deci-
sionmaking under a straightforward, constraining legal rule but not 
under a discretionary standard. Secondly, within those parameters, 
the presence of balanced legal argument appears to have made it 
more likely that the dispute would be resolved in the direction that 
the decider preferred in the absence of law. 
 This relationship between the content of legal norms and legal ar-
gument can be explained by considering the mechanics of legal con-
straint on our subjects. The straightforward constraining rule, as op-
posed to the discretionary standard, made it significantly more diffi-
cult for subjects to justify the outcome they preferred. Nevertheless, 
subjects who felt most strongly about the righteousness of that pre-
ferred outcome were most likely to be motivated to engage in work to 
get around the rule and reach their preferred outcome. When argu-
ment was present, it made this work easier by providing ready-made 
justifications for the judge to rely upon. With the assistance of this 
work short cut, the proportion of subjects that reached their pre-
ferred outcomes in the face of a constraining rule was significantly 
higher for subjects in the presence of argument than for subjects in  
its absence.  
 Our results lend support to a reconceptualization of legal argu-
ment: in the resolution of disputes, it is a tool put into service for the 
sake of providing a convincing justification of a preferred outcome. In 
short, there is evidentiary support for the notion that legal argument 
makes it easier for judges to work around the straightforward dic-
tates of the law. More research is necessary before such a reconcep-
tualization would be warranted, but our results should make propo-
nents of straightforward adjudication question whether they can ac-
cept on blind faith the notion that legal argument in the adversarial 
system has the salutary effect of making judges more likely to reach 
the best legal outcomes.   
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VII.   APPENDIX (EXPERIMENT FRAMEWORK)
Note: Bracketed explanatory phrases in the section titles were not 
visible to subjects. 
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